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Abstract: A Flight Operational Quality Assurance (FOQA) program monitors pilots by 
storing hundreds of flight parameters i.e. speed, altitude, instrument readings etc. 
retrievable for playback. Thus, FOQA is a powerful aviation safety tool, but FOQA has 
also raised critical data-protection issues regarding its use for disciplinary or FAA 
actions, and/or release to outside entities for civil or criminal litigation. 
The FAA has a strong desire to expand FOQA, however only 17% of smaller air 
operators have voluntarily adopted it, and little is known about pilot perceptions of 
FOQA. Technology improvements and cost reductions have enabled its adoption. The 
General Accountability Office has maintained negative pilot perceptions are a barrier to 
further adoption of FOQA.  
This is the first comparative research to study pilot perceptions of FOQA. This research 
hypothesized that public sector pilots flying under a FOQA program would have more 
positive perceptions, and lower negative perceptions of FOQA than their counterparts not 
flying under a FOQA program. No significant differences were found on either the 
positive perceptions scale, t(185) = .24, p=.81, or the negative perceptions scale t(185)= 
1.56, p=.12. A one-way ANOVA indicated that education level did not have a significant 
relationship with either positive, F(3.178) = .69, p=.56, or negative, F(3.179) = 1.04, 
p=.38 , perceptions of FOQA.   
It was hypothesized that pilots with FOQA experience would have higher positive 
perception scale scores, and lower negative perception scale scores, than pilots operating 
without FOQA experience. The one-tailed point-biserial correlation indicated that there 
was no significant relationship between positive, rpb(142) = .09, p= .14, or negative 
rpb(142) = -.16, p= .03, perceptions with FOQA experience.  
Public sector small air operators operate in a variety of environments that pose risk to 
safe operations. FAA’s promotion of safety data analysis by air operators through 
voluntary adoption of FOQA has stalled. If FAA desires to retain global leadership in 
flight data analysis and safety risk management, they should initiate new action to 
reenergize broader adoption of FOQA including the protection of sensitive safety 
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Electronic Monitoring of Employees 
Managerial tools to electronically monitor employee’s performance have 
exploded over the past 25 years as has employee use of technology to perform routine 
work. The ability of employers and other interested parties to track individual behavior 
has rapidly expanded through the use of the personal computer, the internet, cellular 
phones and the Blackberry which have all been integrated with the global positioning 
system (GPS). The National Association of Working Women reported in 1984 that some 
20% of clerical employees were monitored by computer (Grant & Higgins, 1987). Three 
years later, The Office of Technology estimated that six million workers were being 
electronically monitored (U.S. Congress Office of Technology Assessment, 1987). By 
2001, the American Management Association reported that 82% of the managers 
surveyed used some type of electronic monitoring system to ascertain employee 
performance (Papini, 2007), and electronic tracking and monitoring has continued to 
grow throughout the first decade of the 21
st
 Century enabling increases in organizational 
productivity, but also creating employee concerns about the privacy, use, access, and 




FOQA Data Analysis for Safety 
Electronic monitoring of a pilot’s performance is possible through the use of a Flight 
Data Analysis (FDA) program or Flight Operational Quality Assurance (FOQA) program (FDA 
is used internationally and FOQA is the term used in the United States). FOQA programs obtain 
and analyze flight data about a pilot’s performance. Digital quick access data recorders (QAR’s) 
on board modern aircraft store hundreds of parameters about the flight such as: aircraft speed, 
altitude, instrument readings, power lever and switch positions (Lacagnina & Rosenkrans, 2004). 
This information can be retrieved after landing, or transmitted directly to the ground, for 
downloading into software enabling the flight to be recreated and replayed for further review 
and evaluation.  
“Federal aircraft programs operate and maintain aircraft that are engaged in some of the 
most dangerous types of flight possible. For example, United States Department of Agriculture 
(USDA) Forest Service pilots often fly 150 feet above the ground level at roughly 175 miles per 
hour when dropping fire retardant in an effort to suppress forest fires” (U.S. Government 
Accountability Office, 2004, p. 29). FAA flight inspection aircraft also are operated at tree top 
level at high speeds to assure the integrity of ground navigational signals used to vertically and 
laterally guide aircraft to the runway in poor weather conditions. Thus, this specialized federal 
segment of the aviation industry could benefit significantly by voluntarily adopting FOQA as a 
component of their overall safety management system. FAA’s newly proposed Safety 
Management System (SMS) regulations will require air operators to analyze their organizational 
risks and maintain processes and systems to acquire data. FOQA could play a significant part of 
an air operator’s safety management system; however FAA does not propose to make FOQA 




FOQA programs have provided one of the most powerful tools available to aviation safety, but 
electronic pilot monitoring using FOQA has also raised critical data-protection issues and pilot 
concerns about its use for disciplinary or FAA regulatory actions, and/or release of FOQA data 
to outside entities for civil or criminal litigation. FOQA can become an important integrated 
component of an air operator’s safety management system; however pilot perceptions of FOQA 
may be precluding its wider adoption throughout the aviation industry. 
 
Problem 
The FAA has a strong desire to expand the use of FOQA as a voluntary safety reporting 
tool which is dependent to a certain degree on pilot acceptance (Federal Aviation Administration, 
2010), but relatively little is known about pilot perceptions of being electronically monitored by 
FOQA. Technology improvements and cost reductions in equipment over the past 15 years have 
enabled adoption of FOQA by small air operators (Lacagnina, 2007; U.S. Government 
Accountability Office, 2010). Small air operators have higher safety risk factors and higher 
accident rates; however only 17% of smaller air carriers have voluntarily adopted FOQA. In 
addition, only one federal air operator (FAA’s flight inspection organization) has chosen to adopt 
FOQA even though small air operators have higher safety risk factors and higher accident rates 
than larger air operators (The Federal Aviation Administration’s Oversight…, 2010; Von Thaden 
& Wiegmann, 2011; Federal Aviation Administration, 2011). The National Transportation 
Safety Board (NTSB) has recommended that the Federal Aviation Administration require small 
air operators to adopt flight data analysis or FOQA programs (U.S. National Transportation 




reluctance of small air operators to voluntarily adopt FOQA can be attributed, in part, to negative 
pilot perceptions of FOQA (U.S. Government Accountability Office, 1997, 2010); however 
research has not been conducted on pilot perceptions of FOQA, and there is currently little 
understanding of pilot perceptions of FQOA based upon empirical evidence.  
Understanding pilot perceptions of FOQA (both positive and negative) could enhance 
aviation safety by leading to an increased understanding of pilot concerns and thereby mitigate 
some of the perceived barriers to expanding FOQA to small air operators. In addition, this 
research could contribute to the development of mitigation strategies that might minimize 
negative pilot perceptions of being electronically monitored by FOQA. 
 
Purpose 
The purpose of this research was to describe and compare public sector pilot perceptions 
of FOQA. This research compared the positive and negative perceptions of pilots operating for 
federal public sector air operators operating under a FOQA program, with those pilots operating 
without one. Understanding pilot perceptions about FOQA should enhance aviation industry 
knowledge about pilot hopes and perceived benefits of FOQA, as well as their fears and concerns 
of electronic monitoring, thereby enabling the mitigation of the perceived barriers that have 







Significance of the Study 
The FAA states that their most important job is to protect the safety of the traveling 
public through ensuring that all air operators provide effective high quality safety programs 
(Federal Aviation Administration, 2010a). FOQA programs have enabled the routine gathering 
of flight data providing objective evidence of the effectiveness of air operator safety programs 
and training programs in large air carrier airline operations. On the other hand, despite significant 
advancements in technology and equipment cost reductions in recent years, small air operators 
have not voluntarily adopted one of the most powerful tools available to the airlines (Pfleiderer 
& Chidester, 2011). The FAA’s senior official responsible for aviation safety acknowledged 
during Congressional testimony in 2010 that the accident rate for small air operators (on-demand 
Part 135) was higher than that for large scheduled airlines, but the FAA anticipated all operators 
would receive the same type of data driven surveillance (italics added) in the future under 
FAA’s new Safety Assurance System known as SAS (FAA’s oversight of on-demand aircraft 
operations, 2010). Thus, small air operators and the FAA would benefit if small operators 
voluntarily adopted FOQA and data was available. In addition, small public sector air operators 
operating in high risk environments could better understand their level of safety and be able to 
focus upon risk mitigation strategies by voluntarily adopting and using FOQA to identify adverse 
safety trends that could lead to incidents or accidents. In addition, adoption of FOQA beyond the 
Federal Aviation Administration flight program into the broader federal public sector flight 
programs would set an example for the private sector small air operator community. Acceptance 
of FOQA by pilots requires an understanding of pilot perceptions (both positive and negative) of 
FOQA in order for air operators to develop strategies to successfully promote its voluntary 




pilot perceptions between those pilots operating under a FOQA program (FAA sample), with 
those operating without one (GSA sample). The survey instrument (PFOQA) was co-authored by 
Dr. Thomas R. Chidester, Manager of the FAA Aerospace Human Factors Research Division, 
and this researcher to elicit pilots’ level of agreement with a series of 16 statements about FOQA 
(Pfleiderer & Chidester, 2011; Lowe, Pfleiderer & Chidester, 2012). 
 
Limitations of the Study 
This study was limited to a comparison of federal public sector pilots employed by small 
air operators in the federal public sector consisting of a total population of 396 pilots. The 
researcher assumed pilots understood the survey and responded in a truthful manner on the 
PFOQA survey. The FAA sample (188 pilots) had a 56% response rate; however the GSA 
sample (208 pilots) had a 46% response rate. Generally, a response rate of at least 50 percent is 
considered adequate for analysis and reporting (Barbbie, 1990, p. 182). Thus, the GSA response 
rate was slightly lower than generally required and may have compromised external validity of 
the study’s findings beyond the sample. In addition, the researcher was unable to obtain a true 
random sample of the pilot population because anonymity was required in order to obtain pilot 
responses to the survey. 
“The Principal Components Analysis of the PFOQA survey instrument suggested the 
need for further augmentation of the PFOQA survey items because only 60% of the variance in 
the dataset was explained by the extracted components, leaving 40% unexplained” (Pfleiderer & 
Chidester, 2011, p. 9). Also, according to Pfleiderer and Chidester (2011), the PFOQA 




p. 10). Finally, surveys of private sector pilot perceptions may or may not be similar to those 
obtained during this research of public sector pilot perceptions of FOQA.  
 
Theoretical Perspective 
This study was designed to investigate and understand pilot perceptions of Flight 
Operational Quality Assurance programs in federal public sector flight operations. Thus, the 
study involves explaining dynamic social phenomena subject to continuous change. This study 
embraces the Post-Positivism perspective which attempts to find if differences exist and 
determine the best explanation for the differences if they exist. This research also recognizes that 
knowledge and perceptions can and do change over time, and thus the research may contribute to 
the development of potential mitigation strategies that can overcome negative perceptions of 
being electronically monitored through a Flight Quality Assurance Program.   
Aviation safety has improved significantly over the past 50 years due to advancements in 
technology, equipment, operating procedures and training practices (Weigmann & Shappell, 
2003). This research focuses on the psychosocial perspective of aviation human factors. 
“Historically, the psychosocial models have been overlooked by those in the aviation industry 
(Weigmann & Shappell, 2003, p. 35). Understanding individual pilot perceptions of the potential 
safety benefits of FOQA is important in order to develop an understanding of the human 
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1) Do FAA pilots flying under a FOQA program in the public sector have more positive 
perceptions of FOQA than their counterparts not flying under a FOQA program? 
Null Hypothesis: There will be no significant difference between the positive perceptions of 
federal public sector pilots flying with a FOQA program and their counterparts not flying under a 
FOQA program. 
2) Do pilots flying without a FOQA program have more negative perceptions than their 
counterparts flying with a FOQA program? 
Null Hypothesis: There will be no significant difference between the negative perceptions of 
federal public sector pilots flying without a FOQA program and their counterparts flying with a 
program. 
3) Is there a relationship between education levels and perceptions of FOQA?  
Null Hypothesis: There will be no relationship between federal public sector pilot education 
levels and positive or negative perceptions of FOQA. 
4) Is there a relationship between positive perceptions of FOQA and the amount of time spent in a 
FOQA program?  
Null Hypothesis: There will be no relationship between positive public sector pilot perceptions 
of FOQA and the amount of time spent in a FOQA program. 
5) Is there a relationship between negative perceptions of FOQA and the amount of time spent in a 
FOQA program? 
Null Hypothesis: There will be no relationship between negative public sector pilot perceptions 







Listing of Acronyms Used in the Study 
 
ALPA Airline Pilots Association 
AJW FAA Aviation System Standards internal routing symbol 
AMOA Air Medical Operators Association 
ARAC Aviation Rulemaking Advisory Committee 
ASAP Aviation Safety Action Program 
CAMI Civil Aerospace Medical Institute  
CFR Code of Federal Regulations 
DOT Department of Transportation 
DFDAU Digital Flight Data Acquisition Unit 
ECS Electronic Control System 
EPM Electronic Performance Monitoring 
FAA Federal Aviation Administration 
FAR Federal Aviation Regulation 
FDA Flight Data Analysis 
FDR Flight Data Recorder 
FSF Flight Safety Foundation 
FOIA Freedom of Information Act 
FOQA Flight Operational Quality Assurance Program  
GAO Government Accountability Office  
GPS Global Positioning System 
GSA General Services Administration 




ICAO International Civil Aviation Organization 
IRB Institutional Review Board 
NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
NSF National Science Foundation 
NTSB National Transportation Safety Board 
OTA Office of Technology Assessment 
OIG Office of Inspector General 
PFOQA Perceptions of Flight Operational Quality Assurance 
questionnaire 
QAR Quick Access Recorder 
SARP Standard and Recommended Practice 
SAS Safety Assurance System 
SMS Safety Management System 
USDA United States Department of Agriculture  







REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
 
The objective of this literature review was to provide an overview of the current 
knowledge and research regarding the background, history and safety benefits of Flight 
Operational Quality Assurance (FOQA) programs, as well as the individual and organizational 
issues associated with electronic monitoring of employees. FOQA can become an important 
integrated component of an air operator’s safety management system; however pilot perceptions 
of FOQA may be precluding its wider adoption throughout the broader aviation industry. In sum, 
management in many industry sectors has continued to embrace electronic employee monitoring, 
and the number and types of employees electronically monitored has rapidly expanded as the 
technology has evolved; however privacy issues, concerns about management abuse and release 
of electronic data to outside entities has also grown. 
 
History of Electronic Monitoring 
Monitoring employees is not new. Since the early days when labor was organized around 
common tasks, the monitoring of individual and organizational output became a supervisory and 




avenues for managers and supervisors to electronically monitor employee behavior and 
productivity. Susser (1988) reported that electronic monitoring was generally used for three 
purposes: measuring performance, preventing internal theft, and enforcing laws and workplace 
rules (Susser, 1988).  
Today, personal computers, the internet, cell phones and computing tablets have all 
become a part of daily life. These sophisticated and integrated tools have rapidly become 
common throughout many industries and continued to enhance management’s ability to digitally 
track individual activities. Management can effectively plan and monitor workload distribution 
and assess the quality of an individual’s performance. Management can also store large amounts 
of electronic performance data raising privacy and fairness issues, as well as debates about the 
proper amount of social monitoring and control of employees in our free society. 
Over two decades ago the U.S. Congress Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) 
attempted to discriminate computer based monitoring or electronic monitoring, from the more 
traditional service observation, or practice of listening to an employee’s conversation during an 
economic transaction (U.S. Congress Office of Technology Assessment, 1987). The OTA 
foresaw questions of fairness, dignity, autonomy and control as growing issues associated with 
the anticipated widespread availability of new technologies. The report noted the potential for 
employee resistance and resentment due to perceptions of unfair implementation and/or data 
misuse by management and/or outside organizations (U.S. Congress Office of Technology 
Assessment, 1987). Electronic monitoring capabilities have continued to expand since OTAs’ 
1987 report. Cell phones are routinely equipped with GPS location services making everyone’s 
actions more visible for marketing, and for use in the new field of technology forensics – a 




monitoring technology is a widely available and increasingly cost effective option for tracking 
individual activities in many industries. 
History of FOQA 
“FOQA programs evolved from accident investigation practices using Flight Data 
Recorders (FDRs), which were mandated in 1958 by the Civil Aeronautics Administration” 
(Lowe et al., 2012, p. 1). Early flight data recorders had limited monitoring capabilities capturing 
only six parameters (time, airspeed, heading, altitude, vertical acceleration and time of radio 
transmission); however they were useful for post-accident analysis enabling federal regulators 
and aviation safety professionals to conduct forensic studies to understand and improve 
operational and maintenance safety. The use of flight data recorders for non-accident routine data 
collection did not begin in the United States, but began with British Airways and Air Portugal in 
the early 1960’s (Lacagnina & Rosenkrans, 2004). TWA was the first U.S. air carrier to begin a 
flight data analysis (FDA) program in the late 1960’s, but the program was limited to a few 
monitored parameters related to the pilots approach and landing performance (Lacagnina & 
Rosenkrans, 1998). By 1972 eight foreign airlines had adopted some type of flight data analysis 
program, but the U.S. continued to lag behind with only four U.S. airlines (United, US Airways, 
Continental and Alaska Airlines) adopting a program by the early 1990’s (U.S. Government 
Accountability Office, 1997).  
The FAA contracted with the Flight Safety Foundation in 1991 to work with 
representatives of the air carrier industry to complete a report on the potential benefits of flight 
data analysis. The 1992 report coined the term Flight Operational Quality Assurance (FOQA) 




crew performance, air carrier training programs and operating procedures, air traffic control 
procedures, airport maintenance and design, and aircraft operations and design” (Flight Safety 
Foundation, 1992. p. 1). The report also stated that the appropriate use of FOQA data by airlines 
and other industry groups would result in the significant improvement of flight safety by 
identifying operational irregularities that could foreshadow accidents and incidents (Pfleiderer & 
Chidester, 2011) The report recommended that FAA move forward in promoting voluntary 
adoption of FOQA by large air operators, and the report also stated that smaller jet and propeller 
aircraft could also benefit by adopting FOQA (Flight Safety Foundation, 1992). Finally, the 
study concluded that implementation of FOQA programs across the aviation industry could have 
a more positive impact on aviation safety than any other human factors program, and thus the 
FAA should be a strong advocate for its implementation (Pfleiderer & Chidester, 2011).   
The Department of Transportation and the Federal Aviation Administration convened a 
safety conference in Washington, D.C. in January 1995 to focus on ways to improve aviation 
safety and increase public confidence in air transportation. FAA Administrator David Hinson, 
and Department of Transportation Secretary Frederico Pena actively promoted the safety benefits 
of FOQA during this national safety summit attended by over 1000 airline and union aviation 
officials (Federal Aviation Administration, 1995) following a year of tragic air carrier accidents 
in 1994 (Wald, 1995). At the conclusion of the conference, the Airline Pilots Association 
(ALPA) agreed to end their long opposition to FOQA because of fears it would be used against 
individual pilots (Phillips, 1995). Subsequently, FAA’s Director of Flights Standards, Mr. 
Thomas Accardi, began a $5.5 million FOQA demonstration project to facilitate the start-up of a 
cadre of large U.S. airline FOQA programs with the goal of assessing the costs, benefits and 




States (Flight Safety Foundation, 1998). This FOQA Demonstration Project, known as 
Demoproj, was generally successful in promoting the implementation of voluntary FOQA 
programs at large air operators (U.S. Government Accountability Office, 1997). The 
Government Accountability Office (GAO) reported that the initiative established collaborative 
partnerships between the FAA and interested airlines (U.S. Government Accountability Office, 
1997). By the end of the decade, the number of large air carriers initiating FOQA had doubled in 
the U.S. (Fernandes, 2002). By 2010, the GAO stated the majority of large air carrier flights 
were operated under a FOQA program, but only 17% of the smaller air carriers had adopted 
FOQA (U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2010). 
 
FOQA’s Safety Benefits 
FOQA programs change behavior through improved shared knowledge. According to the 
behavior-based theory of accident prevention, improving people’s behavior has a major influence 
on accident frequency (Whittingham, 2008). Aircraft safety and air traffic performance has been 
improved in air carriers that have implemented FOQA programs, and the data analysis has also 
improved FAA’s air traffic procedures. For example, FOQA data have objectively established 
when pilots were flying high speed approaches contrary to safe operating procedures and/or the 
airline’s approved operations manual (Lacagnina & Rosenkrans, 1998). FOQA has also revealed 
pilots over rotating (raising the aircraft’s nose too high during takeoff) which can result in the 
aircraft’s tail striking the ground. Identification of this situation has enabled training 




The examination of another airline’s FOQA data revealed several instances of 
unstabilized approaches where pilots exceeded the maximum flap and landing gear speeds during 
an approach to landing. In this interesting case, the airline voluntarily shared their FOQA data 
with other airlines and the FAA which revealed a problem with FAA’s air traffic procedures at 
the airport. Specifically, air traffic controllers were placing pilots in the difficult position of 
being kept high and fast close to the airport resulting in pilots attempting to reduce altitude and 
slow down simultaneously (Federal Aviation Administration, n.d.). This resulted in the aircraft 
exceeding landing gear and flap operating speed limits (Federal Aviation Administration, n.d.). 
Another airline’s FOQA analysis confirmed that the incidence of descent rate deviations during 
approaches were significantly higher at a particular runway enabling the amendment of the air 
traffic instrument flight procedure (U.S. Government Accountability Office, 1997). A different 
airline’s FOQA program revealed pilot deviations occurred more frequently during visual flying 
than during instrument flying conditions, thereby prompting the airline’s flight training managers 
to rethink the relative emphasis given visual vs. instrument flying in the airline’s training 
program (U.S. Government Accountability Office, 1997). High speed or excessively steep 
landing approaches can lead to runway excursions on wet or slippery runways as well as 
excessive wear on the aircraft’s tires and brakes. Thus, improvements in pilot behaviors and air 
traffic procedural improvements were possible with the availability of flight data obtained from 
these FOQA programs. Finally, data presented by Captain Mike Holtom, British Airways, at an 
international safety seminar in Rio de Janerio, Brazil in November 1999 revealed interesting 
potential long term safety benefits of adopting a FOQA program.  
An aviation insurance company recently overlaid FAA data for U.S. airlines not using 




revealed that airlines using such data for seven to 14 years have a lower accident rate than 
U.S. airlines which do not have FOQA programs in place. The comparison also revealed 
that those airlines which have used FOQA for more than 14 years have an accident rate 
under half that experienced by U.S. carriers (Holtom, 2000, p. 7).  
FOQA programs have also improved maintenance practices (Fernandes, 2002). Aircraft 
maintenance programs require routine inspection of aircraft systems and special inspections if 
aircraft operating limitations are exceeded. A special maintenance inspection is typically 
required in order to identify any damage caused by extending the flaps at high speed, or failing to 
retract the flaps prior to acceleration. FOQA data provide an objective method of detecting 
deviations by pinpointing the exact time and severity of the flight crews’ oversight (Pfleiderer & 
Chidester, 2011). Without FOQA, management must rely upon subjective pilot reporting, and the 
pilot’s diligence entering handwritten records into the aircraft’s logbook.  
FOQA has improved safety at a small public sector air operator as well (Lowe et al., 
2012). FAA’s Aviation System Standards (AJW) flight inspection program operates small turbo-
jet and turbo-propeller aircraft used for inspecting FAA’s navigational facilities to assure the 
accuracy of their guidance signals that aircraft rely upon for lateral and vertical guidance while 
landing in poor visibility conditions. FAA aircraft must conduct non-standard flight maneuvers 
at very low altitudes to ascertain the signal accuracy of the navigation facility and enable FAA 
technicians to calibrate and recalibrate the Instrument Landing Systems (ILS) that guide aircraft 
safely to the ground. Thus, FAA’s flight inspection pilots operate aircraft in areas of higher risk 
than typical air operators engaged in routine air transportation. FAA’s public sector operations 




during fire-fighting operations and the U.S. Coast Guard rescue missions require their pilots to 
conduct high risk flight operations.  
FAA’s flight inspection FOQA program began in 2006 and quickly provided safety 
benefits to the operation and the organization’s pilots. FOQA revealed that pilots were routinely 
leaving the aircraft’s autopilot engaged below safe operating limits, i.e., less than 50 feet above 
the ground (Federal Aviation Administration, 2011). Leaving the autopilot engaged outside of 
normal safe operating limits (generally 200 feet above the ground) can result in an aircraft 
accident or serious incident if the autopilot malfunctions because the pilot will not have enough 
time and available altitude to recover the aircraft before it strikes the ground.  
The FAA flight inspection FOQA program revealed these unsafe routine practices 
enabling the development of animated training programs using the FOQA data that was 
delivered as a powerful safety message to the pilots. Safety improvements were rapid – a 39% 
reduction in unsafe behavior within three months and a 45% reduction within six months 
(Federal Aviation Administration, 2011). 
 
FOQA’s Economic Benefits 
Electronic monitoring of pilot performance through FOQA can be an economic benefit to 
large air carrier operators because it can prevent an aircraft from being removed from revenue 
service because of a component failure. For example, FOQA data has been used to detect and 
notify management when an aircraft’s engine has exceeded its maximum temperature limitation 
as well as the elapsed time the limit was exceeded. This information is critical for avoiding 
engine component failure and obtaining the manufacturer’s expected time between overhauls 




fuel consumption (Fernandes, 2002; Stolzer, 2002). Specifically, FOQA enables the operator to 
identify aircraft which are burning more fuel than expected, “possibly due to misalignment of 
components increasing aircraft drag, thereby resulting in knowledge, correction and economic 
savings for the operator” (Fernandes, 2002, p. 43). 
 
FOQA for Small Operators 
The Flight Safety Foundation Corporate Advisory Committee began a demonstration 
project in 2002 to assess the feasibility of using FOQA to improve corporate aviation safety 
(Lacagnina, 2007). The NTSB placed renewed emphasis on FOQA in 2009 during public 
hearings on the safety of helicopter emergency medical service providers. Following the 
hearings, a joint statement of support for voluntary FOQA was submitted by the Helicopter 
Association International (HAI) and the Air Medical Operators Association (AMOA), while the 
NTSB recommended that FAA “require helicopter emergency medical services operators to 
install flight data recording devices and establish a structured flight data monitoring program that 
reviews all available data sources to identify deviations from established norms and procedures 
and other potential safety issues” (U.S. National Transportation Safety Board, 2009, p. 18).  
FAA Administrator Randy Babbitt also renewed the agency’s emphasis on voluntary 
FOQA throughout the entire aviation industry in 2010 during a meeting with aviation industry 
leaders (Federal Aviation Administration, 2010). Although FAA has continued to strongly 
support FOQA over the past 15 years, it has not been voluntarily implemented by most small 
aircraft operators (U.S. National Transportation Safety Board, 2009). Thus, the significant safety 




post-accident/incident forensic analysis, has not permeated the small air operator sector (Federal 
Aviation Administration, 2010). 
 
FOQA Technology Advancements 
The 1990’s was a time of rapid computer hardware and software advancement enabling 
digital recording and data processing/analysis capabilities. Typically, only 16 to 29 parameters 
were recorded on crash resistant flight data recorders used for post-accident analysis by the 
National Transportation Safety Board; however the rapid advancement of modern digital aircraft 
now allows for a comprehensive set of conditions to be monitored on non-crash resistant Quick 
Access Recorders (QAR’s) that are able to monitor 200-500 parameters by sensing output from 
the aircraft’s Digital Flight Data Acquisition Unit (DFDAU), the same device feeding the post- 
accident flight data recorder (Holtom, 2000). This revolution in information and computer 
technology also resulted in QAR’s being able to hold 100 to 200 hours of flight data which are 
then accessible by removable optical disk or personal computer memory cards (U.S. Government 
Accountability Office, 1997). Increases in computing power enabled the rapid analysis of flight 
data on personal computers. The evolution of data link systems provides transmission of large 
digital data streams being directly supplied to central ground-based analysis systems (Holtom, 
2000). Thus, near real time flight data monitoring programs, as well as the compilation of 
industry wide data has become a real possibility. The continued miniaturization of computer 
technology over the past decade, with commensurate affordability and PC computer graphics, 
enables small operators to obtain the benefits of “one of the most powerful safety tools 






FOQA implementation requires investment in equipment, training and personnel. 
Physical equipment expenditures include investment in Quick Access Recorders (QARs), 
recording/replay media and computers for data analysis. A typical QAR costs approximately 
$20,000; however, the aircraft downtime to install the QAR, plus the costs of spares must also be 
considered (Lacagnina, 2007). FOQA equipment is not the greatest cost in implementing FOQA. 
It accounts for only 15% of the total while “80% of FOQA’s costs are typically associated with 
personnel” (Fernandes, 2002, p. 28).   
The recent reductions in technology costs have brought the opportunity for smaller 
aircraft to benefit from FOQA’s electronic pilot monitoring systems. Historically, some air 
carriers were deterred because they perceived FOQA as relatively expensive in initial capital 
costs of hardware and operational costs, to include computer software (U.S. Government 
Accountability Office, 1997); however by 2007 the total cost for the equipment required to 
participate in a FOQA program had dropped to the range of $10,000 to $13,000 (with an 
additional $2,000 of aircraft installation costs) (Lacagnina, 2007). By 2009, the NTSB stated that 
technology existed to build image and data recording devices that were relatively inexpensive 
and lightweight for installation on new and existing small aircraft, and the advances in 
technology have resulted in the ability to implement FOQA with fewer personnel per aircraft 
(U.S. National Transportation Safety Board, 2009). Thus, the recent rapid advances in FOQA 
technology, commensurate with the reduction in technology and human capital investments 
required to implement FOQA, enable even the smallest operator to obtain the safety benefits of 




resources and data to leverage both safety and economic FOQA benefits (Lacagnina & 
Rosenkrans, 2004; Lacagnina, 2007). 
 
Mandatory or Voluntary FOQA? 
The concept of FOQA as a voluntary pilot monitoring program became an institutionally 
accepted practice within the United States over the past quarter century. The safety benefits of 
flight data monitoring programs have been recognized by the 188 contracting states of the 
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). ICAO established electronic flight data 
monitoring as an international standard required for international operations of turbine powered 
aircraft having a maximum take-off weight of over 59,525 lbs. (International Civil Aviation 
Organization, 2001). In addition, ICAO recommended the adoption of a flight data analysis 
program for turbine aircraft with a maximum take-off weight in excess of 44,093 lbs. This ICAO 
Standard and Recommended Practice (SARP) went into effect on January 1, 2005 (International 
Civil Aviation Organization, 2009).  
China was the first civil aviation authority to mandate a flight quality assurance 
monitoring program in 1997 followed by the French civil aviation authority in 2000 (Fernandes, 
2002). In 1998, the FAA decided to continue to encourage voluntary adoption of FOQA for all 
U.S. registered aircraft regardless of size. According to FAA’s FOQA program manager, Dr. 
Thomas Longridge: “it would be premature for FAA to mandate FOQA because U.S. aviation is 
in the early stages of developing FOQA and is primarily in a learning mode” (Lacagnina & 
Rosenkrans, 1998, p. 5). Thus, the FAA continued with FOQA as a voluntary program and filed 




noncompliance with the ICAO requirement on flight data analysis programs. A difference is a 
formal notification to ICAO of a State’s noncompliance with an annex required by Article 38 of 
the Chicago Convention.  
ICAO member states may choose to accept or reject the U.S. stance against mandatory 
FOQA because other countries are not obligated to honor the United States difference. They may 
legally deny airspace entry to any aircraft or operations not in compliance with ICAO 
requirements.  FAA has become aware of at least four instances where the lack of a flight data 
analysis program has resulted in small air operator turbine powered aircraft (in excess of 59,525 
lbs.) being denied entry into foreign airspace due to the lack of United States compliance with 
the mandated ICAO standard on flight data analysis (Federal Aviation Administration, 2010a).  
The February 12, 2009 accident of a Colgan Air Continental Connection Flight 3407 in 
Buffalo, New York resulted in another FAA safety summit primarily directed at regional and 
smaller air operators for the purpose of identifying and implementing safety improvements (U.S. 
FAA, 2010). A key outcome was the verbal commitment by the smaller air operators to expand 
their implementation of voluntary safety FOQA programs and “develop data analysis processes 
to ensure effective use of the digital data” (Federal Aviation Administration, 2010a, Appendix 2, 
p. 2). 
 
Safety Management Systems and FOQA 
FOQA has been linked with the implementation of a Safety Management System in the 
international community. The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) has defined a 




the necessary organizational structures, accountabilities, policies and procedures including a 
mandatory FOQA program to be part of the air operators SMS for international operations 
(International Civil Aviation Organization, 2009). In 2006, ICAO adopted the international SMS 
standard to take effect on January 1, 2009. Thus, SMS and FOQA have been adopted by the 
international aviation community as an international standard governing global flight operations 
for the past four years.  
The FAA defines a Safety Management System (SMS) as a structured, risk-based 
approach to managing safety in both its internal organization notices and in the federal register 
for the purposes of continuing improvements in accident rates (Federal Aviation Administration, 
2008, 2009). The commercial accident rate has decreased substantially over the past 10 years; 
however the FAA’s Office of Accident Investigation and Prevention identified 129 accidents 
involving air carrier aircraft from 2001 to 2010 that could have been mitigated if air carriers had 
implemented a safety management system to identify hazards in their daily operations and 
developed methods to control risk (Federal Aviation Administration, 2010b). Congress directed, 
in August 2010 (Public Law 111-216), that FAA propose a Safety Management System 
regulation governing large air carrier operations under CFR 49 FAR Part 121 (Airline Safety and 
Federal Aviation Administration Extension Act, 2010). Although FAA proposed an SMS 
regulation in the Federal Register in November 2010 (Federal Aviation Administration, 2010b), 
no final SMS rule has been published, nor have any firm SMS compliance dates been established 
in nearly three years. In addition, no SMS regulatory proposal has been announced for the small 
air operators operating turbo-jet aircraft in domestic or international airspace. These small 
operators are projected to grow at an average of 3.5 % per year between now and 2033 (Federal 




existing voluntary safety programs such as FOQA (italics added) as part of the FAA’s final 
Safety Management System regulation (Airline Safety and Federal Aviation Administration 
Extension, 2010); however FAA’s unpublished predecisional draft SMS regulation does not 
mandate FOQA as part of FAA’s proposed new SMS regulation governing large air carrier 
operations (Federal Aviation Administration, 2011b). 
FAA’s new proposed SMS regulations require “the certificate holder to develop and 
maintain processes to analyze safety risk and maintain processes and systems to acquire data 
(italics added) with respect to its operations, products and services in order to monitor the safety 
performance of the organization” (Federal Aviation Administration, 2011b, Sections 5.55 (a), 
5.71). Thus, air operators will be required to decide on the methods they will use to acquire 
safety data that will provide a robust composite picture of operational safety performance. On the 
other hand, FAA’s new proposed regulations do not require or specify the types of systems FAA 
expects air operators to use to assess system safety.  
“Safety Management is not an add-on, but an essential part of the system’s core business” 
(Reason, 1997, p. 114), and therefore safety management requires an effective safety information 
system. “An effective safety information system is the principal basis of an informed safety 
culture” (Reason, 1997, p. 194) and is of critical importance; however FAA will rely upon 
industries’ decisions regarding the types of data collection methods they chose to use in 
implementing their safety management system. FOQA will remain a voluntary program for all 






Targeting Safety Risk and Data Sharing 
FAA’s Safety Management System regulations, as currently proposed, do not mandate 
the adoption of FOQA, nor does the SMS regulation require air operators to share their voluntary 
safety monitoring data with the FAA. On the other hand, FAA intends to rely upon data-driven 
risk management to allocate FAA resources for safety oversight by “processing and analyzing 
internally and externally developed data, identifying hazards and analyzing risk directly to FAA 
safety oversight processes and conducting audits of industry SMS activities” (Federal Aviation 
Administration, 2008, p. 13). The GAO raised concerns over two decades ago reporting the 
following in 1991: 
FAA does not determine which airlines pose the greatest safety risks. Although FAA 
maintains numerous data bases with safety-related information, it does not integrate such 
data as accidents, incidents, pilot deviations, and inspection results to assess overall 
airline risk and to determine how it could best use its limited inspection resources. In 
1987, we reported that FAA could develop criteria for targeting inspections at high-risk 
conditions and noted that targeting is important because FAA will never have sufficient 
resources to inspect all carriers all of the time. (U.S. Government Accountability Office, 
1991, p. 7) 
 
Four years later in 1995, the GAO expressed concern about FAA’s ability to identify 
aviation safety risk precursors because of the reliance on data from numerous databases that 




1995). Thus, FAA’s safety related decisions will not be reliable and will not effectively support 
FAA’s inspection and certification mission (U.S. Government Accountability Office, 1995). 
Data sharing and data analysis are especially important for safety at small air operators. 
Von Thaden reported that small air operators had significantly higher safety risk factors 
associated with inadequate training, procedural standardization issues, and inadequate 
supervision and surveillance as compared with their large air operator counterparts (Von Thaden 
& Wiegmann, 2011). The GAO reported that small air operators had higher accident rates and 
received few if any inspections by the FAA (U.S. Government Accountability Office, 1991). 
More recently in 2010, the GAO concluded that vulnerabilities in aviation data systems, and the 
lack of FAA access to industries’ safety information, would limit the usefulness for the safety 
analyses system planned to support FAA’s oversight of air operator’s SMS programs (U.S. 
Government Accountability Office, 2010). In addition, the Department of Transportation’s 
Office of Inspector General was also critical of FAA’s ability to conduct safety trend analysis 
due to limited access to data for FAA’s new Aviation Safety Information Analysis System 
known as ASIAS (U.S. Department of Transportation, Office of the Inspector General, 2009). In 
order for safety risk modeling to be successful at targeting the areas of greatest safety 
vulnerability, risk models must contain adequate data and be validated and revalidated against 
actual outcomes in order to be effective as a safety alerting tool. “A successful model tells you 








Protection of FOQA Data  
Employees are well aware that digital data can easily be broadly distributed. Grant & 
Higgins (1987) found an employee perception’s of computer monitoring was negatively 
associated with an increase in size of the potential audience of the data. They proposed that 
broader distribution of electronically gathered data to senior managers reduced the acceptance of 
electronic monitoring of employees (Grant & Higgins, 1987). 
The FAA promoted the protection of FOQA data from wide distribution when it 
convened an airline safety summit in 1995 attended by over 1,000 aviation industry leaders 
(Phillips, 1995). At the conclusion of the conference, FAA Administrator David Hinson issued a 
policy statement in which FAA stated the agency would refrain from using FOQA data in FAA 
enforcement actions against airlines and pilots when such data was part of an approved FAA 
FOQA program established by the air operator (Phillips, 1995; Trautman, 1995). Three years 
later, the FAA engendered industry trust by agreeing to strip FOQA data of information that 
might identify pilots, and Administrator Jane Garvey committed the FAA to a policy prohibiting 
the agency from using de-identified FOQA information in enforcement actions except in 
egregious cases (McKenna, 1998). That same year (1998), the International Civil Aviation 
Organization developed Standards and Recommended Practices (SARPs) for flight data analysis 
protection. The U.S. Congress also established legal protection of voluntarily submitted FOQA 
data to the FAA through passage of CFR 49 U.S.C. 40123. Finally, in 2001, the FAA enhanced 
its previous commitment to FOQA data protection through the passage of Federal Aviation 




The FAA hoped and expected that all of these federal and international efforts would 
promote the expansion of voluntary adoption of FOQA programs into the broader aviation 
community, and adoption of FOQA by the large air carriers continued to slowly expand in the 
large air carrier sector with 45% adopting the program by the end of 2010 including seven of the 
top eight largest U.S. passenger carrying operators (Federal Aviation Administration, 2010b). On 
the other hand, smaller air carriers and federal public sector aviation operators (i.e., U.S. Forest 
Service, NASA, NSF etc.), as well as business aviation operators did not adopt FOQA despite 
the governments’ data protection initiatives cited above. The Flight Safety Foundation’s C-
FOQA demonstration project for business jet owners and operators resulted in only two 
organizations participating due to “unresolved questions about data protection and resistance by 
pilots” (Lacagnina, 2007, p. 12). Similar concerns were also raised in a series of 12 FAA 
industry safety forums held across the United States in 2010 (Federal Aviation Administration, 
2010). 
By 2010, only 17% of the small air operators had voluntarily adopted FOQA (U.S. 
Government Accountability Office, 2010), and only one public sector operator (FAA’s own 
flight inspection program) chose to voluntarily adopt it despite the safety benefits that electronic 
pilot monitoring could have on the specialized aircraft missions performed by small operators in 
the public sector (Federal Aviation Administration, 2011). 
 
Litigation and FOQA Data 
Individual supervisors, air operators and the FAA have limited control over the release of 
FOQA data in civil or criminal litigation. Privacy and access to digital data by civil courts 




runway. Comair had encouraged voluntary safety reporting by its pilots under FAA’s Aviation 
Safety Action Program (ASAP). ASAP is a program that encourages voluntary reports of 
mistakes and operational anomalies. ASAP reports are supposed to remain confidential, under 
similar federal regulations protecting FOQA programs, but the U.S. District Court serving 
eastern Kentucky ruled that Comair’s ASAP reports must be released to the plaintiff’s attorneys 
for use in their wrongful death suits against Comair (Velocci, 2008). The judge ordered the 
plaintiffs’ attorneys to keep the records from the public in an attempt to retain the incentive for 
continued submission of voluntary safety reporting (Velocci, 2008). The judge stated:  
“The allowance of the privilege to withhold evidence that is demonstrably relevant in 
a…trial would cut deeply into the guarantee of due process of law and gravely impair the 
basic function of the courts [and] it is the opinion of this Magistrate Judge that the failure 
of Congress to create any privilege for ASAP reports weighs heavily against the creation 
of any privilege by this Court” (Comair’s motion for a protective order…, 2008, p. 7, p. 
11). 
Thus, there is no guarantee FOQA data can always be protected from release even though 
49 U.S.C. 40123 and Title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations Part 193 established legal 
protection of FOQA data from public disclosure. It remains unclear what affect the judge’s 
ruling in the Comair ruling will have on the future release of FOQA or other voluntarily reported 
safety data in future wrongful death lawsuits; however even FAA acknowledges conditions when 
FAA will share FOQA data with outside organizations under 14 CFR section 13.401(e): “…the 
FAA may release FOQA information in support of enforcement actions that involve criminal or 




Maurice Halbwachs stated in his 1950 work The Collective Memory – “what stands in the 
foreground of group memory are the remembrances and events of collective experiences of 
concern to the greatest number of members” (Halbwachs, 1950, p. 43). Certainly the release of 
FOQA data through the judicial system creates a collective experience of group memory for 




The potential for civil and/or criminal suits against individual pilots exists. The 
International Civil Aviation Organization leaves the decision regarding prosecution of aviation 
professionals to each individual State as outlined in Article 12 of the Chicago Convention: “Each 
contracting State undertakes to insure the prosecution of all persons violating the regulations” 
(Mateou & Mateou, 2010, p. 20). An Air France pilot was convicted of involuntary manslaughter 
in 1956 when his DC-6 aircraft crashed and killed 56 passengers during an approach to the Cairo 
airport (Dekker, 2009). Since then, many countries including the U.K, Japan, New Zealand, 
China, France, Argentina, Italy, Switzerland, Canada, the Netherlands, Portugal and Spain have 
been involved in the criminalization of pilots and other aviation professionals - “Aviation 
professionals can be criminally prosecuted for their negligent, albeit unintentional, acts or 
omissions…” (Mateou & Mateou, 2010, p. 20). Thus, the means, methods, process and policies 
of holding airmen accountable for their actions varies around the globe. 
The Airline Pilots Association (ALPA) gave Congressional testimony on July 27, 2000 during 




Although criminal prosecution of commercial pilots has not been an issue in the United 
States to date, ALPA pilots are becoming increasingly concerned about the possibility of 
criminal liability. This concern is generated primarily due to the increased foreign 
operations of U.S. air carriers. Pilots now operate over and into countries whose criminal 
laws are considerably different than those of the United States (The trend towards 
criminalization, 2000, p. 3).  
ALPA expressed concern that the threat of criminal prosecution undermines pilot 
cooperation and the providing of information and data that is of assistance in determining the 
probable cause of the accident and the prevention of recurrence (The trend towards 
criminalization, 2000). 
A State’s investigatory body has access to extensive amounts of post-accident data that 
might lead to an individual airmen being prosecuted with FOQA data implicating the pilot in 
negligent acts or omissions even if they were unintentional. In 2001, ICAO addressed the 
disclosure of records leaving wide judicial discretion to the State: 
The State conducting the investigation of an accident or incident, wherever it occurred, 
shall not make the following records available for purpose other than accident or incident 
investigation, unless the appropriate authority for the administration of 
justice…determines that their disclosure outweighs the adverse domestic and 
international impact such action may have on that or any future investigations (ICAO, 
2001, Annex 13, paragraph 5.12). 
 
The prospect of criminal prosecution of a pilot in the United States became close to 




charges should be pursued following the accident of USAir Flight 5050 at LaGuardia Airport in 
1989 when 61 survivors were pulled from the East River following the aircraft skidding off the 
runway due to the pilot failing to detect an improperly positioned rudder trim control (Safety 
Board Blames Pilot for Fatal USAir Accident, 1990). 
 
Convicting Pilots and other Aviation Personnel 
“On June 26, 1988, a brand new Airbus A320 crashed during an air show in Habsheim, 
France. Three passengers died and 50 people were injured in the accident. Flight data recordings 
obtained from the aircraft implicated the actions and omissions of the pilot. A judicial 
investigation was subsequently launched wherein the pilots were accused of manslaughter. The 
prosecution relied heavily on the FDA data that was admissible in court resulting in the captain 
of the flight being sentenced to six months in prison and a 12 month probation being given to  
the co-pilot” (Mateou & Mateou, 2010, p. 58). More recently, in July 2000, Judge Dominique 
Andreassier found Continental Airlines and a mechanic guilty of manslaughter in the crash of 
Air France’s Concorde Flight 4590. The French court ruled that there was an “incontestable link” 
between the negligence of a Continental maintenance engineer and the fuel tank rupture and 
subsequent fire that made the aircraft uncontrollable when the French Concorde ran over a metal 
strip that had been dropped on the runway by a departing Continental DC-10 aircraft minutes 
earlier (Flottau & Wall, 2010, p. 37). Commentary on the French court ruling convicting the 
Continental mechanic of manslaughter stated: “Unlike the U.S. and many other countries, French 
policy-makers reject the idea- in the aftermath of crashes or serious incidents- of relying on the 
decisions of technical investigators. Instead, the French Justice Department runs an independent, 




Flight 52 of ValuJet crashed in the Florida Everglades at a speed of 400 miles per hour 
shortly after take-off from Miami International Airport on May 11, 1996 (Walters & Sumwalt 
III, 2000, p. 103). Improperly packed oxygen generators (prepared by Sabre Tech) ignited an 
uncontrollable fire which burned through control cables filling the cabin and cockpit with smoke 
resulting in all 105 passengers, the pilot, copilot and three flight attendants being killed (U.S. 
National Transportation Safety Board, 1996). “The US Federal and Florida State Prosecutors 
brought criminal charges, 110 counts of manslaughter and 110 counts of third degree murder 
against ValuJet’s maintenance contractor Sabre Tech” (Mateou & Mateou, 2010, p. 61). 
Although Sabre Tech was ultimately acquitted of the federal charges, it was only because the US 
11
th
 Circuit Court of Appeals could not find “an intent to harm” (Mateou & Mateou, 2010, p. 62) 
and Sabre Tech was given a $500,000 fine with three years’ probation. “Sabre Tech was the first 
American aviation company to be criminally prosecuted for its roles in an American airline 
crash” (Mateou & Mateou, 2010, p. 61).  
The more recent ruling by the U.S. district court in the Comair case of 2006 may be more 
relevant to pilots concerned about the release of air operator data because the judge compelled 
the release of voluntarily gathered data for use in a wrongful death litigation raising the 
increasing likelihood that the United States would follow much of the rest of the world in the 
pursuit and prosecution of pilots for negligent acts or omissions even if they were unintentional. 
“There are a number of factors, such as the media, political pressure and financial interests, that 
may influence the prosecution of pilots” (Mateou & Mateou, 2010, p. 97). Thus, the growing 
initiation of criminal and/or civil prosecution of pilots, coupled with the court’s access to FOQA 
data, could be associated with negative pilot perceptions of FOQA and a detriment to the wider 




Employee Perceptions of Electronic Monitoring 
Research on the relationship between electronic monitoring and employee perceptions of 
fairness revealed conflicting conclusions. Alder (2001) found routine versus occasional 
electronic monitoring led to increased perceptions of fairness by employees. On the other hand, 
Grant and Higgins (1987) found that employees accepted electronic monitoring measures as 
more objective, but not necessarily as “fair” (Grant & Higgins, 1987, p. 105), while Aiello and 
Kolb (1995) found that individual electronic monitoring systems were less likely to be accepted 
by employees, than broader monitoring systems. They found higher perceptions of fairness when 
group performance was monitored (Aiello & Kolb, 1995). 
FOQA programs routinely monitor all flights and all pilots operating a FOQA equipped 
aircraft. Thus, electronic monitoring of pilots by FOQA is objective as compared to traditional 
subjective pilot evaluation reports submitted by check airman, flight instructors and/or training 
evaluators. Therefore, pilot perceptions of FOQA could be perceived as more positive and less 
negative when a FOQA program is in place possibly due to the perceived improvement over 
traditional subjective pilot monitoring systems. On the other hand, operators with FOQA 
programs have not eliminated the existing subjective pilot monitoring systems already in place 
and FOQA could be perceived by pilots as a form of electronic surveillance. Thus, pilots 
operating under FOQA may have more negative perceptions and fewer positive perceptions of 
FOQA than their unmonitored counterparts. 
Views of electronic monitoring may even vary depending upon the language used to 




respondents believed all electronic surveillance should be illegal whereas only 30.5% agreed 
when the system was called electronic monitoring.  
Kidwell and Bennett (1994) found that employee perception of procedural fairness is an 
important antecedent of attitudinal responses to the use of Electronic Control Systems (ECS). 
Procedural fairness of ECS was measured by asking employees how fair they regarded the 
procedures used to evaluate their work performance using the electronic control system. They 
found that feedback sign (positive or negative), feedback frequency, and supervisor 
consideration were positively and significantly related to computer-monitoring satisfaction (r
2
 = 
.45). When procedural fairness was included it raised the overall adjusted r
2
 to .53 accounting for 
over 50% of the variance and they concluded: “that controlling for performance 
appraisal/feedback variables and employee attitudes toward the appropriateness of monitoring, 
the perceived procedural fairness of an ECS will be positively related to employees’ satisfaction 
with the system” (Kidwell & Bennett, 1994, p. 206, p. 210). 
McNall and Roch (2009) examined a theoretical model focusing on how Electronic 
Performance Monitoring (EPM) practices influenced interpersonal and informational justice 
which they contended were relevant in building trusting relationships between monitored 
employees and their supervisors. They found the presence of an explanation for electronic 
monitoring was positively related to perceptions of informational justice (McNall & Roch, 
2009). A survey of 960 Internal Revenue Service employees indicated the perception variation of 
electronic monitoring could be attributed to the employee’s prior belief about monitoring 
(Vaught, Taylor, & Vaught, 2000). A recent FAA report indicated that employee perception and 
trust issues continue as challenges to air operators that have implemented a FOQA program 




ultimately used by the air operator’s management, and other parties, may be associated with 
increased positive perceptions and decreased negative perceptions of FOQA.  
 
Targeting individual or organizational performance? 
Management and employee behaviors and attitudes contribute to the formulation of an 
organizational culture (Alder, 2001). Grant and Higgins (1987) found that “supervisors played a 
critical role in determining whether monitoring would be stressful and whether feedback would 
undermine or promote satisfaction” (Grant & Higgins, 1987, p. 110). Today’s electronic 
monitoring systems can be used by management to target individuals, and/or to improve 
organizational performance.   
Kidwell and Bennet (1994) found that electronic monitoring programs can lead to 
undesirable employee responses such as withdrawal, sabotage, and diminished citizenship-like 
behavior. Grant and Higgins (1987) found that “monitored employees were less likely to pursue 
complex customer inquiries, than their unmonitored coworkers, and they complained more of 
hostile or stressful work groups” (Grant & Higgins, 1987, p. 105).  
Employee involvement is the keystone to identifying the weakness and vulnerability of 
safety deficiencies before an aviation accident occurs (Wiegmann & Hui, 2011). Certain 
organizational factors have been related to commercial aviation accidents (Von Thaden & 
Wiegmann et. al., 2011). FOQA enables the development of an informed safety culture which is 
defined by James Reason as one in which those who manage and operate the system have current 
knowledge about the human, technical, and organizational factors that determine the safety of the 




identity for organization members and facilitates the generation of employee commitment 
connecting organizational behavior with management interests (Wiegmann & Hui, 2011).  
Alder (2001) found that supportive organizational cultures can improve employee 
attitudes and acceptance of electronic monitoring. On the other hand, trust in a supervisor does 
not necessarily translate into organizational trust because the implementation of universal 
procedures in a just manner typically forms the basis of the employee’s trust of their organization 
(Pearce & Klein, 2010). Thus, management and supervisory attitudes and behaviors may have 
considerable influence on the pilots’ perceptions of FOQA and on the ultimate development of 
an informed safety culture. 
 
Experience and Trust Relationships 
Pearce and Klein (2010) researched the relationship between greater employee 
experience and trust levels of their employer. They found a negative correlation. Specifically, 
they found organizational tenure was negatively associated with organizational trust after 
controlling for age, supervisory trust, and organizational commitment (t= -3.11; p<.01) (Pearce 
& Klein, 2010). This same pattern was also found with employees in a large government agency 
(Pearce & Klein, 2010). Pearce and Klein (2010) also proposed that increased employee 
experience increases the likelihood that the employee will have witnessed or personally 
experienced trust betrayals and procedural failures; however data was not provided that 
supported this proposition. A meta-analysis by Dirks and Ferrin (2002) reported reliable 
correlations between trust in a supervisor and improved job performance, job satisfaction, and 




Similar patterns might be present within pilot communities. For example, pilots with 
increased FOQA experience may have increased negative perceptions of the FOQA program, as 
compared with pilots operating without FOQA, because of the increased opportunity for 
experiencing procedural failures and/or perceived betrayals of trust surrounding the use of 
electronically gathered FOQA data. 
 
Trust – How Important? 
Trust has been defined as “the willingness of a party to be vulnerable to the actions of 
another party based on the expectation that the other will perform a particular action important to 
the trustor, irrespective of the ability to monitor or control the other party” (Mayer, Davis, & 
Schoorman, 2006, p. 85). Trust has also been described as an attitude of the trustor toward the 
trustee (Whitener, Brodt, Korsgaard, & Werner, 2006). Managerial activities may be critical 
components in successfully developing a climate of transactional trust between the employer and 
employee when initiating an employee electronic monitoring program and trust can be damaged 
easily by a perceptual betrayal (Reina & Reina, 2006). 
The employer’s intents and purposes of their electronic monitoring programs have been 
associated with employee acceptance of electronic monitoring programs. If employees believe 
the primary focus of electronic monitoring is employee development, or to improve performance 
by providing training, they are more likely to accept it (Alder, 2001). McNall and Roch (2009) 
found the presence of an explanation for electronic performance monitoring was positively 
related to perceptions of informational justice (r=.51; p<.01). Previous research by Douthitt and 




to voice their opinion about the design and implementation of the monitoring system had higher 
perceptions of procedural justice as compared to unwelcomed participant input (McNall & Roch, 
2009). These concepts may be critical to the establishment of an aviation culture that is perceived 
as a just safety culture because employees are trustful of the manner in which the voluntarily 
submitted data will be used (Reason, 1997).  
Mayer, Davis and Schoorman (2006) found that when the situational risk is thought to be 
greater than the level of trust, engagement in the situational risk is less likely to occur. Pilot 
perceptions of trust in their employer’s behavior may be a barrier preventing small air operators 
from adopting FOQA on a voluntary basis because an employer’s initiation of an employee 
electronic monitoring, such as FOQA, may raise trustor/trustee issues within the air operator’s 
smaller pilot community that the operator may desire to avoid. Concerns could potentially 
outweigh the hopes for the safety benefits FOQA portends.  
The subsequent uses of the electronic FOQA data following implementation of FOQA 
may create a psychological contract breach between management and the air operators’ pilots. A 
psychological contract breach is defined as “the subjective perception of a failure to fulfill 
promised obligations” (Robinson 2006, p. 333). For example, if FOQA data were used as the 
justification for disciplinary action, or public ridicule of a pilot, the other pilots might perceive it 
as a violation of informational and/or procedural justice, i.e., a psychological contract breach of 
the trustor/trustee relationship. Thus, pilots operating for an air operator with a FOQA program 
might actually have more negative perceptions of FOQA than their counterparts without FOQA 
due to psychological contract breaches having occurred with their employer - the air operator. 
Therefore, how the air operator intends, and ultimately uses FOQA data, may be a critical 




FOQA as well as an overall stronger organizational trust of their employer. A meta-analysis 
conducted by McNall and Roch (2009) revealed a fairly strong relationship (r= .43) between 
informational justice and trust. Thus, the air operator’s ultimate use of FOQA data may be 
critically important to the pilot perceptions of informational justice and organizational trust of 
their employer. 
This is the first comparative survey research conducted on pilot perceptions of being 
continuously electronically monitored by a Flight Operational Quality Assurance (FOQA) 
program. Thus, this research contributes an aviation component to the body of research on 
employee attitudes and acceptance of electronic monitoring previously conducted by Grant & 
Higgins (1987), Aiello & Kolb (1995), Alder (2001), McNall & Roch (2009) and Pearce & Klein 
(2010). In addition, it illuminates and differentiates the relevant areas of FOQA concerns of 
public sector pilots whereas previous research on Flight Data Analysis (FDA) or Flight 
Operational Quality Assurance Programs has been generally limited to the potential safety and/or 
economic benefits of FOQA (Flight Safety Foundation,1992; Fernandes, 2002; Lacagnina & 











Flight Operational Quality Assurance (FOQA) programs increase aviation safety by 
providing powerful insights into daily aircraft operations potentially improving pilot training, 
altering unsafe operational practices and lowering operating costs. FOQA programs use flight 
data obtained from Quick Access Recorders (QARs) that record digital flight data (e.g. speeds, 
altitudes, bank angles, etc.) to be easily downloaded from the aircraft and compiled for analysis 
for a full picture of how the pilots operated the aircraft during the entire flight. Data are gathered 
and automatically recorded on all aircraft with QARs that are available as retrofit or originally 
installed equipment. This electronic digital monitoring program also enables aircraft operators to 
establish pre-determined unsafe parameters that will automatically flag and trigger the time and 
event of the infraction for further review by supervisory and management personnel. 
The Federal Aviation Administration’s promotion of flight data monitoring programs 
began with an FAA funded Flight Safety Foundation (FSF) study in 1991. The FSF completed 
their landmark report in 1992 (Flight Safety Foundation, 1992) in which they coined the term 




for obtaining and analyzing data recorded in flight to improve flight crew performance, air 
carrier training programs and operating procedures, air traffic control procedures, airport 
maintenance and design, and aircraft operations and design” (Flight Safety Foundation, 1992, p. 
1). The Flight Safety Foundation report found approximately 25 air carriers with some form of a 
FOQA program and concluded that the appropriate use of FOQA data by airlines could result in 
a significant improvement of flight safety by identifying operational irregularities that could 
possibly foreshadow accidents and incidents (Flight Safety Foundation, 1992). 
The safety benefits of flight data monitoring programs were recognized by the 
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) which concluded that a flight-data analysis 
program (FDA) should be a mandatory program for large turbine powered aircraft (International 
Civil Aviation Organization, 2009). They subsequently required it for all member states 
operating internationally under Annex 6, Part 1, Amendment 33 (International Civil Aviation 
Organization, 2009); however the United States filed a difference with ICAO notifying member 
states of the Unites States’ choice to have flight data monitoring programs remain voluntary for 
all U.S. aircraft engaged in both domestic and international air operations (Federal Aviation 
Administration, 2010b). Thus, FAA has publicly stated it intends to have FOQA remain a 
voluntary safety program for all sectors of the Unites States aviation industry. 
The FAA has actively promoted FOQA programs in all aviation sectors since 1995 
(Federal Aviation Administration, 1995). Forty-one of the 90 air carriers in the United States had 
adopted FOQA as a voluntary safety program by the end of 2010 including 22 of the 30 largest 
air carriers, operating more than 50 aircraft, and seven of the top eight largest U.S. passenger 
carrying operators (Federal Aviation Administration, 2010b). On the other hand, smaller air 




though technology improvements and cost reductions in equipment over the past 15 years have 
enabled adoption into the smaller aircraft used by these operators (U.S. National Transportation 
Safety Board, 2009). Thus, small air operators have not experienced the significant safety and 
economic benefits seen by larger operators (Federal Aviation Administration, 2010).  
One reason for the reluctance to adopt FOQA has been the alleged negative pilot 
perceptions of FOQA (U.S. Government Accountability Office, 1997, 2010). Aviation Week and 
Space Technology reported that pilots fear the misuse and release of FOQA data under 
provisions of the U.S. Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) and/or through civil discovery in 
lawsuits (McKenna, 1998). Flight Safety Foundation’s demonstration project for small operators 
resulted in only two operators participating due to unresolved questions about data protection 
and resistance by pilots (Lacagnina, 2007). Similar pilot concerns were raised in a series of 12 
FAA industry safety forums conducted around the country (Federal Aviation Administration, 
2010), yet no survey instrument had ever been developed to assess and gather empirical 
information about pilot perceptions of FOQA prior to April, 2011 (Pfleiderer & Chidester, 2011). 
Thus, no study has ever been conducted capturing pilot perceptions of FOQA programs, or 
comparing the pilot perceptions of those operating under a FOQA program to those operating 
without one. Understanding pilot perceptions (both positive and negative) of FOQA is important 
because it can lead to the development of strategies that promote the voluntary adoption of 
FOQA, thereby expanding the aviation safety benefits of FOQA to the small air operator sector 








The problem for this study is that relatively little is known about pilot perceptions of 
FOQA. Public sector air operators have not adopted voluntary flight operational quality 
assurance programs except for FAA’s flight inspection flight program. The Government 
Accountability Office (GAO) has maintained that the reluctance to adopt FOQA can be 
attributed in part to the negative pilot perceptions (U.S. Government Accountability Office, 
1997, 2010), but empirical research on pilot perceptions of FOQA has not been conducted to 
access the accuracy of this assertion. Understanding pilot perceptions of FOQA in the public 
sector could enhance aviation safety by leading to improved understanding of pilot perceptions 
and the development of mitigation strategies to expand FOQA adoption in public sector aviation 
programs, and thereby improve aviation safety. 
 
Research Design 
This research was descriptive and comparative in design, with respondents anonymously 
self-reporting to questions on a newly developed survey instrument hosted on-line. The 
instrument was developed by this researcher and a colleague from the Federal Aviation 
Administration. It is fully described below. Self-report research involves the standardized 
collection of quantifiable information from all the members of a population, or a representative 
sample, through use of a questionnaire to examine the distributions and relationship(s) among 
variables (Gay, 2000). In this study, pilot opinions and attitudes were assessed by eliciting the 
pilots’ level of agreement with a series of statements about FOQA on two scales: a negative 




by using a standardized on-line data collection instrument consisting of a series of 16 Likert-type 
scaled questions based on expectations about possible positive safety benefits of FOQA and 
negative perceptions and concerns about the potential misuse of flight data collected by FOQA. 
This research measured the relationship among several variables and differences in 
perceptions between two independent groups. “Correlational research designs are procedures in 
quantitative research in which investigators measure the degree of association (or relations) 
between two or more variables using the statistical procedures of correlational analysis” 
(Creswell, 2008, p. 356). The degree of association between the sets of scores reflects whether or 
not there is a consistent, predictable association between the scores (Creswell, 2008). Attitudes 
and opinions on FOQA were gathered from pilots operating in federal public sector flight 
programs in order to measure the degree of correlation with positive and negative attitudes about 
FOQA programs. This research was descriptive research because it “involved describing 
attitudes, opinions and preference” (Gay, 2000, p.275), and it developed themes from the data in 
order to form an in-depth understanding of the central phenomenon (Creswell, 2008). Finally, 
this research was explanatory research. Explanatory research is correlational research in order to 
understand the extent to which variables co-vary (Creswell, 2008). 
 
Population 
The U.S. federal government employed approximately 396 pilots in the 2010/2011 
timeframe, constituting the total population of federal public sector pilots according to the U.S. 
General Services Administration (GSA). The GSA is responsible for monitoring and reporting 




Federal government agencies operate aircraft in a wide variety of missions. For example, the 
U.S. Forest Service employs pilots who operate fire-fighting aircraft and the National Oceanic 
and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) employs pilots who gather weather data. No federal 
public sector flight programs have implemented FOQA except the FAA’s flight inspection flight 
program. The FAA’s federal flight inspection program operates a fleet of 30 aircraft with 180 
pilots located in six locations throughout the United States. 
 
Samples 
Two independent samples of public sector pilots were solicited from the total population 
of 396 federal public sector pilots via an on-line survey using the PFOQA survey instrument 
described below. FAA’s flight inspection flight program constituted one independent sample of 
public sector pilots. This sample consisted of 188 pilots operating under a FOQA program. All 
188 pilots were solicited to respond, but only 102 responses were received – a 56% response 
rate. The remainder of the federal public sector pilot population (n=208 pilots) operating without 
a FOQA program constituted the second independent sample used for research comparison. 
Ninety-six responses were received – a 46% response rate. Thus, the total number of responses 
received from both samples was 198 pilots; however all respondents did not answer all 16 survey 
questions. The missing values for each independent sample and number of responses to each 








1) Do FAA pilots flying under a FOQA program in the public sector have more positive 
perceptions of FOQA than their counterparts not flying under a FOQA program? 
Null Hypothesis: There will be no significant difference between the positive perceptions 
of federal public sector pilots flying with a FOQA program and their counterparts not 
flying under a FOQA program. 
2) Do pilots flying without a FOQA program have more negative perceptions than their 
counterparts flying with a FOQA program? 
Null Hypothesis: There will be no significant difference between the negative perceptions 
of federal public sector pilots flying without a FOQA program and their counterparts 
flying with a program. 
3) Is there a relationship between education levels and perceptions of FOQA? 
Null Hypothesis: There will be no relationship between federal public sector pilot 
education levels and positive or negative perceptions of FOQA. 
4) Is there a relationship between positive perceptions of FOQA and the amount of 
experience in a FOQA program? 
Null Hypothesis: There will be no relationship between positive public sector pilot 
perceptions of FOQA and the amount of time spent in a FOQA program. 
5) Is there a relationship between negative perceptions of FOQA and the amount of 
experience in a FOQA program? 
Null Hypothesis: There will be no relationship between negative public sector pilot 






The Perceptions of Flight Operations Quality Assurance (PFOQA) questionnaire was jointly 
developed as a collaborative effort by the FAA Civil Aerospace Medical Institute (CAMI) and 
the FAA Aviation System Standards (AJW) organization beginning in October, 2009. The 
PFOQA survey was co-authored by Dr. Thomas R. Chidester, Manager of the FAA Aerospace 
Human Factors Research Division, and this researcher, Mr. Thomas C. Accardi, former Director 
of FAA’s Aviation System Standards organization (Pfleiderer & Chidester, 2011). It was 
designed to elicit a pilots’ level of agreement with a series of statements about FOQA programs 
on a four-point Likert-type scale (Strongly Agree, Agree, Disagree, and Strongly Disagree) 
(Pfleiderer & Chidester, 2011). Survey participants were asked to indicate their level of 
agreement with each of the statements using a scale ranging from 1 to 4, with higher values 
indicating agreement and lower values representing disagreement (Pfleiderer & Chidester, 2011). 
Individual items were coded 1 = Strongly Disagree, 2 = Disagree, 3 = Agree, and 4 = Strongly 
Agree.  
The 16 item questionnaire was developed based on industry concerns identified by the 1992 
Flight Safety Foundation Task Force and issues reported by the United States Government 
Accountability Office in 1997 regarding FOQA (Flight Safety Foundation 1992; U.S. 
Government Accountability Office, 1997). “The Perceptions of Flight Operations Quality 
Assurance (PFOQA) questionnaire was designed to assess the participants’ level of agreement 
with a series of statements regarding FOQA – a format widely recognized as one of the best for 
collecting information about attitudes (Nunnally, 1978)” (as cited in Pfleiderer & Chidester, 
2011, p. 1). The evaluation of the reliability and validity of the PFOQA questionnaire was 




Oklahoma City, Oklahoma and published in an April 2011 report (Pfleiderer & Chidester, 2011) 
by the Office of Aerospace Medicine, Washington, D.C. Validity and reliability information for 
the PFOQA instrument is presented below.  
Instrument Description 
The PFOQA survey instrument consists of a series of 16 items organized into two scale 
dimensions containing nine positive and seven negative items (Appendix A). The positive 
perceptions scale consists of a series of questions eliciting pilot feedback on the potential system 
safety benefits of FOQA. It comprises expectations and beliefs about the pilot perceived 
potential safety benefits of FOQA programs. The negative perceptions scale addresses concerns 
about the release of FOQA data to the media and/or courts, data misuse by employers, potential 
use of FOQA data for disciplinary actions against pilots, and general organizational trust issues. 
“The PFOQA scales were based on the assumption that negative and positive perceptions of 
FOQA programs represent two distinct dimensions consisting of expectations about positive 
safety enhancements and concerns about data misuse” (Pfleiderer & Chidester, 2011, p. 2). The 
questionnaire contains one open-ended question at the end of the survey (Please tell us anything 
else you think we should know about your expectations or concerns about FOQA). The 
questionnaire also solicits the pilot’s education level (i.e., Graduate degree, some graduate 
education, bachelor’s degree, associate degree, some college, high school diploma, or less than 







Instrument Pilot Test 
A pretest survey is done to uncover any peculiar defects in a survey instrument and to test its 
broad applicability (Barbbie, 1990). The researcher contacted a former FAA colleague who was 
serving as a consultant for an air carrier operating with a FOQA program. This researcher 
requested the colleague’s assistance in conducting a pilot test of the new PFOQA survey 
instrument in September 2009 enabling data collection and analysis by FAA’s Civil Aerospace 
Medical Institute (CAMI). The air carrier agreed to participate and post the PFOQA survey 
instrument for anonymous on-line responses from the airlines’ 385 pilots under the condition that 
their name never be disclosed in any publication. FAA’s IRB approval of the PFOQA survey 
instrument pilot test was granted on January 7, 2010 by Dr. Thomas E. Hatley, M.D., M.P.H, 
Chairman, Federal Aviation Administration Institutional Review Board (IRB). The on-line 
PFOQA instrument pilot test was hosted by Snap Survey between Feb. 9, 2010 and March 30, 
2010, and was responded to by 199 airline pilots (51% response rate) yielding enough data for 
assessment of the questionnaires’ validity and reliability. 
Scale construction and reliability was completed by the FAA’s Human Factors Division 
researcher, Ms. Elaine Pfleiderer, during the summer of 2010, by splitting the sample using a 
random selection tool enabling approximately half of the cases to be used for the principal 
component analysis (n1=100), and the remaining cases for the reliability analysis (n2=99) 
(Pfleiderer & Chidester, 2011). Sixty-seven respondents (34%) chose to provide written 







Instrument Validity and Reliability 
The PFOQA survey instruments’ internal consistency reliability was assessed from the 
randomly split sample. Both the Positive Perceptions Scale (a =.86) and the Negative 
Perceptions Scale (a =.88) contained good internal consistency (Pfleiderer & Chidester, 2011). 
“The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measure of sampling adequacy (a test of partial correlation 
among variables) for the PFOQA questionnaire items was .80, exceeding the criterion of .60 for 
a good solution” (Pfleiderer & Chidester, 2011, p.6) . The FAA’s Civil Aerospace Medical 
Institute, Human Factors Division completed their report on the validity and reliability analysis 
of the PFOQA survey instrument in April 2011. The report concluded that the current version of 
the PFOQA questionnaire was best suited for assessing pilots’ attitudes prior to FOQA 
implementation, but the report also stated that “the PFOQA questionnaire may be sufficient for 
many applications in its current form even though aspects of the questionnaire could be 
improved” (Pfleiderer & Chidester, 2011, p. 9). 
 
FAA Pilot Sample (Pilots in a FOQA Program) and Procedures 
The FAA flight inspection program was selected as a purposive sample in support of this 
FOQA research. A purposive sample is also referred to as judgment sampling because it “is 
believed to be representative of a given population” (Gay, 2006, p.113). The purposive sample 
population in this research was the only available public sector group of pilots operating aircraft 
in the federal public sector with a FOQA program. This researcher obtained approval from FAA 
Institutional Review Board chairman, Dr. Thomas Hatley, to administer the PFOQA survey 




requirements for surveying federal employees under FAA’s Civil Aerospace Medicine Institute’s 
requirements. The PFOQA survey instrument was hosted on-line between February 24, 2010 and 
April 28, 2010 for anonymous responses by the FAAs’ 188 member flight inspection pilots of 
whom 102 pilots responded yielding a 56% response rate exceeding the 50% response rate  that 
is generally considered adequate for analysis and reporting (Barbbie, 1990). 
 
GSA Pilot Sample (Pilots Not in a FOQA Program) and Procedures 
The researcher sought permission for a second purposive independent sample of federal 
public sector pilots from the U.S. General Services Administration (GSA). The GSA is 
responsible for the federal fleet including ground and air vehicles owned by the federal 
government (excluding the U.S. Department of Defense). This researcher had access to the 
appropriate officials within the GSA because of his active involvement with the promotion of 
FAA’s aviation safety programs as the former Director of FAA’s Flight Standards Service in 
Washington, D.C., from 1991 – 1997 with national responsibility for air carrier and general 
aviation operations and maintenance safety. Aviation officials from the GSA authorized, 
promoted, and supported the use of the new PFOQA on-line survey instrument by making it 
available to all federal flight program pilots (excluding FAA)– a population of 208 pilots. The 
GSA officials also agreed that the Oklahoma State University Institutional Review Board’s 
approval would be an acceptable IRB approval authority for the conduct of the GSA survey. The 
Oklahoma State University Institutional Review Board approved the GSA survey research on 
July 5, 2011 (subsequently extended), and the on-line PFOQA survey was conducted for the 




second independent purposive sample of federal pilots that were operating without a FOQA 
program for comparative purposes with the FAA pilot sample operating with a FOQA program. 
Ninety-six responses were received (a 46% response rate). “At least 50 percent is generally 
considered adequate for analysis and reporting” (Barbbie, 1990, p.182). Thus, the GSA response 
rate was slightly lower than generally required and may have compromised external validity of 
the study’s findings beyond the sample. 
 
Data Analysis 
The researcher was unable to obtain true random samples of the public sector federal pilot 
population because anonymity was required in order to obtain pilot responses to the survey. On 
the other hand, each pilot had an opportunity to participate if they chose to do so. Although a true 
random sample of pilots was not possible, Sheskin states: “it would be highly unusual to find an 
experiment that employed a true random sample” (Sheskin, 2007, p.1). 
The t test was performed to address the research question: Do FAA pilots flying under a 
FOQA program in the public sector have a more positive perception of FOQA than their 
counterparts not flying under a FOQA program? The t test was also used to address the research 
question: Do pilots flying without a FOQA program have more negative perceptions than their 
counterparts flying with a FOQA program? This researcher also addressed whether a relationship 
existed between the pilot’s education level and the pilots’ perceptions of FOQA on either the 
positive or negative scales. The one-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) was used to analyze 




experience in a FOQA program and the positive and negative perceptions of FOQA. The Pearson 
Product-Moment Correlation was used to research these relationships. 




Research Questions, Data Sources, and Analysis Procedures 
 
Research Question Data Source Analysis Procedure(s) 
1) Do FAA pilots flying under a 
FOQA program in the public 
sector have more positive 
perceptions of FOQA than 
their counterparts not flying 
under a FOQA program? 
 
PFOQA survey  
 
 
Frequency distributions  
 
t-test for two independent 
samples. 
2) Do pilots flying without a 
FOQA program have more 
negative perceptions than their 









t-test for two independent 
samples. 
3) Is there a relationship between 
education levels and 






4) Is there a relationship between 
positive perceptions of FOQA 
and the amount of experience 






Correlation – Point-biserial 
correlation coefficient. 
5) Is there a relationship between 
negative perceptions of FOQA 
















Introduction and Overview of the Study 
Flight Operational Quality Assurance Programs are electronic digital pilot and aircraft 
monitoring systems that enable air operators to establish pre-determined unsafe parameters that 
automatically monitor and record: flight control inputs, flight instruments, and power lever and 
flap positions etc. FOQA time stamps the recording if a predetermined parameter is exceeded 
marking the data for investigation. Thus, FOQA enables pilot training providers, as well as 
policy and standards personnel, to have an understanding of the pilot’s airmanship skills and 
application of aeronautical knowledge, as well as his/her compliance with safe 
operating/approved procedures and practices. FOQA is also available to company management 
personnel for disciplinary purposes, regulatory authorities for pilot violation enforcement action 
and other parties seeking judicial action against an individual pilot and/or air operator.  
The FAA has actively promoted the voluntary adoption of FOQA programs in large and 
small commercial aviation sectors since 1995; however only large air carriers have taken 
advantage of the safety benefits it provides. On the other hand, smaller public and private sector 
air operators have not implemented FOQA programs despite the FAA’s encouragement and the 




Aviation Week and Space Technology reported that pilots fear the misuse and release of 
FOQA data under provisions of the U.S. Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) and/or through 
civil discovery in lawsuits (McKenna, 1998). The Flight Safety Foundation attempted to solicit 
small operator support for FOQA in 2007 by establishing a FOQA demonstration project for 
small operators; however it was not successful because only two operators chose to participate 
due to “unresolved questions about data protection and resistance by pilots (Lacagnina, 2007). In 
2010, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) maintained that the reluctance to adopt 
FOQA programs could be attributed in part to negative pilot perceptions of FOQA (U.S. 
Government Accountability Office, 2010). Thus, understanding pilot perceptions of FOQA may 
contribute to the further adoption of FOQA programs by small operators and thereby improve 
aviation safety. 
Research on pilot perceptions of FOQA has not been conducted, and relatively little is known 
about pilot perceptions of FOQA programs. Furthermore, a valid and reliable research survey 
instrument to capture pilot perceptions of FOQA was not available until April 2011. The purpose 
of this research was to compare the pilot perceptions of FOQA within the federal public sector. 
The research compared positive and negative perceptions of pilots operating for federal public 
sector air operators with a FOQA program (FAA pilot sample), with those federal public sector 







1) Do FAA pilots flying under a FOQA program in the public sector have more positive 
perceptions of FOQA than their counterparts not flying under a FOQA program? 
Null Hypothesis: There will be no significant difference between the positive perceptions 
of federal public sector pilots flying with a FOQA program and their counterparts not 
flying under a FOQA program. 
2) Do pilots flying without a FOQA program have more negative perceptions than their 
counterparts flying with a FOQA program? 
Null Hypothesis: There will be no significant difference between the negative perceptions 
of federal public sector pilots flying without a FOQA program and their counterparts 
flying with a program. 
3) Is there a relationship between education levels and perceptions of FOQA?  
Null Hypothesis: There will be no relationship between federal public sector pilot 
education levels and positive or negative perceptions of FOQA. 
4) Is there a relationship between positive perceptions of FOQA and the amount of time 
spent in a FOQA program?  
Null Hypothesis: There will be no relationship between positive public sector pilot 
perceptions of FOQA and the amount of time spent in a FOQA program. 
5) Is there a relationship between negative perceptions of FOQA and the amount of time 
spent in a FOQA program? 
Null Hypothesis: There will be no relationship between negative public sector pilot 




Data Gathering Process 
The PFOQA survey instrument was used to gather data from two independent public 
sector pilot samples – one operating with a FOQA program (FAA pilot sample) and one 
operating without a FOQA program (GSA pilot sample). Data was gathered on a series of sixteen 
items organized into two scale dimensions containing nine positive and seven negative items. 
“The PFOQA scales were based on the assumption that negative and positive perceptions of 
FOQA programs represent two distinct dimensions consisting of expectations about positive 
safety enhancements and concerns about data misuse” (Pfleiderer & Chidester, 2011, p. 2). 
The positive perceptions scale items elicited pilot feedback on the potential system safety 
benefits of FOQA. The negative perceptions scale items addressed pilot concerns about the 
release of FOQA data to the media and/or courts, data misuse by employers, potential use of 
FOQA data for disciplinary actions, and other organizational trust issues. 
 
Independent Sample Comparison 
A generally normal distribution was observed on both the positive and negative 
perceptions scales on both the FAA pilot sample and the GSA pilot sample. These are shown in 
Figures 2 and 3. Both samples were negatively skewed (-.17 and -.55). On the other hand, the 
negative perception scale of the FAA sample was positively skewed (.37), while the GSA sample 
was negatively skewed (-.07). Only two items were in excess of three standard deviations from a 
normal distribution: Item 11 in the FAA sample (I expect FOQA data to provide our pilot group 
with useful feedback on our performance), and Item 8 in the GSA sample (I expect FOQA data 
to be used to optimize maintenance). The standard deviations in both the FAA and GSA samples 




of Means and Standard Deviations by Pilot Sample). Specifically, the standard deviation on the 
positive scale was .48 for the FAA sample and .52 for the GSA sample, while the standard 
deviation on the negative scales was .64 and .69 respectively.  
The summary of the descriptive statistics for the PFOQA survey items for the sample of 
FAA pilots (pilots operating with a FOQA program) are shown in Table 3 (Summary Positive 
Perceptions of PFOQA Questionnaire: FAA Pilot Sample) and in Table 4 (Summary Negative 
Perceptions of PFOQA Questionnaire: FAA Pilot Sample). The summary of the descriptive 
statistics for the PFOQA survey items for the sample of GSA pilots (pilots operating without a 
FOQA program) are shown in Table 5 (Summary Positive Perceptions of PFOQA 
Questionnaire: GSA Pilot Sample) and in Table 6 (Summary Negative Perceptions of PFOQA 
Questionnaire: GSA Pilot Sample). The summary statistics contained in these four tables indicate 




Table 3.  
 
Summary Positive Perceptions of PFOQA Questionnaire: FAA Pilot Sample 
 
PFOQA Item N Missing M SD Skewness Kurtosis 
Positive Perceptions Scale 95 7 3.00 .48 -.17 .30 
(01) FOQA is a program designed 
to enhance safety by identifying 
potential hazards…. 
100 2 3.42 .59 -.44 -.67 
(04) Flying skills have improved or 
will improve with a FOQA 
program in place 
94 8 2.74 .90 -.36 -.56 
(06) I expect FOQA data to be used 
to take action to correct safety 
problems 
98 4 3.30 .60 -.50 1.10 
(07)  I expect FOQA data to be 
used to improve pilot training 
98 4 3.12 .69 -.36 -.17 
(08)  I expect FOQA data to be 
used to optimize maintenance 
84 18 2.82 .84 -.40 -.28 
(10)  I expect FOQA data to be 
used to change cockpit procedures 
97 5 3.10 .51 .17 .76 
(11)  I expect FOQA data to 
provide our pilot group with useful 
feedback on our…. 
98 4 3.07 .74 -.75 .93 
(12)  I expect FOQA data to be 
used to change procedures outside 
our organization 
82 20 2.09 .76 .38 -.02 
(13)  I expect the FOQA program 
to positively impact the safety of 
our operations 








Negative Perceptions Scale 95 7 2.41 .64 .37 .28 
(02)  Gatekeepers are the only 
persons able to access identifying 
information that…. 
93 9 2.96 .90 -.66 -.18 
(03)  I trust management will not 
misuse FOQA data against 
individual pilots 
97 5 2.78 .95 -.45 -.64 
(05)  I worry that FOQA data will 
be a source of information for 
enforcement action… 
97 5 2.42 .85 .19 -.53 
(09)  I worry that FOQA data will 
be used for disciplinary actions 
95 7 2.41 .83 .12 -.49 
(14)  A FOQA program has 
negatively impacted, or will 
negatively impact, the morale… 
93 9 2.26 .79 .57 .13 
(15)  I worry that FOQA data could 
be released under the Freedom of 
Information Act  
87 15 2.69 .81 -.17 -.41 
(16)  I worry that FOQA data could 
be released through civil litigation 
88 14 2.89 .78 -.39 -.08 












Summary Positive Perceptions of PFOQA Questionnaire: GSA Pilot Sample 
 
PFOQA Item N Missing M SD Skewness Kurtosis 
Positive Perceptions Scale 92 4 3.01 .52 -.55 2.21 
(01)  FOQA is a program designed 
to enhance safety by identifying 
potential hazards…. 
93 3 3.30 .64 -.62 .67 
(04)  Flying skills have improved or 
will improve with a FOQA 
program in place 
89 7 2.64 .74 .18 -.45 
(06)  I expect FOQA data to be 
used to take     action to correct 
safety problems 
94 2 3.23 .58 -.39 1.49 
(07)  I expect FOQA data to be 
used to improve pilot training 
94 2 3.10 .67 -.55 .84 
(08)  I expect FOQA data to be 
used to optimize maintenance 
91 5 2.96 .71 -.87 1.50 
(10)  I expect FOQA data to be 
used to change cockpit procedures 
94 2 3.05 .65 -.54 1.21 
(11)  I expect FOQA data to 
provide our pilot group with useful 
feedback on our…. 
94 2 3.01 .73 -.53 .45 
(12)  I expect FOQA data to be 
used to change procedures outside 
our organization 
93 3 2.82 .69 -.35 .29 
(13)  I expect the FOQA program to 
positively impact the safety of our 
operations 









Negative Perceptions Scale 92 4 2.56 .69 -.07 -.11 
(02)  Gatekeepers are the only 
persons able to access identifying 
information that…. 
90 6 2.77 .75 -.08 -.38 
(03)  I trust management will not 
misuse FOQA data against 
individual pilots 
94 2 2.53 .88 -.20 -.63 
(05)  I worry that FOQA data will 
be a source of information for 
enforcement action… 
94 2 2.60 .86 -.04 -.61 
(09)  I worry that FOQA data will 
be used for disciplinary actions 
93 3 2.62 .87 -.19 -.58 
(14)  A FOQA program has 
negatively impacted, or will 
negatively impact, the morale… 
88 8 2.28 .84 .59 -.09 
(15)  I worry that FOQA data could 
be released under the Freedom of 
Information Act  
91 5 2.77 .93 -.19 -.88 
(16)  I worry that FOQA data could 
be released through civil litigation 
92 4 2.95 .83 -.49 -.22 














If a respondent did not complete all 16 items on the survey, the survey data that was 
submitted was utilized during the analysis. The missing data for each question appears with the 
number of responses for each of the 16 response items for both samples (FAA and GSA) as 
indicated on the tables on the previous pages. Some respondents did not complete the entire 
survey, however the data that was submitted was assumed to be valid for the items that were 
submitted and thus were included. No opinion responses were coded as missing for the analysis 
of individual items, and item means were substituted for no opinion values in the computation 
scale scores. 
The FAA sample had more than twice as many missing values as the GSA sample, but 
most of the missing data in the FAA sample were associated with responses on Item 8 (I expect 
FOQA data to be used to optimize maintenance), Item 12 (I expect FOQA data to be used to 
change procedures outside our organization [such as Air Traffic Control]), Item15 (I worry that 
FOQA data could be released under the Freedom of Information Act), and Item16 (I worry that 
FOQA data could be released through civil litigation). Thus, the missing values on the FAA 
sample were limited in scope and centered on these specific items. On the other hand, most of 
the GSA missing values were associated with pilots who indicated that they had no knowledge of 
FOQA and the missing values were widely distributed throughout the survey in contrast to the 
FAA sample. The GSA sample consisted of pilots not flying under a FOQA program, and thus 







Descriptive Statistics  
Positive and Negative Perceptions Scales 
The Positive and Negative Likert-type scale frequency distribution for the FAA pilot sample 
is shown in Figure 2 (Frequency Distributions of FAA Pilot Sample) The shapes of the 
distributions appear to be reasonably normal and no univariate outliers were observed. The GSA 
pilot sample (Positive and Negative Likert-type scale frequency distribution) also appears to be 
normal and similar to the FAA pilot sample with no univariate outliers observed as shown in 





Figure 2. Frequency distributions of FAA Pilot Sample 




Frequency Distribution - Positive Perception Scale  
The survey item frequencies and the associated percentages on the Positive Perceptions 
Scale items for both the FAA and GSA Pilot samples are contained in Figure 4 (Positive 
Perceptions Scale Comparison). The patterns on the responses to these Positive Perceptions 
Scale items for both the FAA and GSA pilot samples appeared to be very similar; however there 
were some notable exceptions. For example, the FAA Pilot sample demonstrated stronger levels 
of agreement than the GSA Pilot sample with Item 01 (FOQA is a program designed to enhance 
safety by identifying potential hazards before they result in an accident). The GSA Pilot sample 
was fairly evenly split between moderate levels of agreement and disagreement on Item 04 
(Flying skills have improved or will improve with a FOQA program in place), whereas most of 
the FAA Pilot sample (67.9%) agreed with this statement. The majority of GSA pilots (83.5%) 
indicated that they agreed with Item 12 (I expect FOQA data to be used to change procedures 
outside our organization [such as Air Traffic Control). On the other hand, the FAA pilots 
operating under a FOQA program disagreed or strongly disagreed with the statement (74.4%) 
thereby producing a near mirror image of the GSA pilot sample on Item 12. Finally, both the 
FAA and GSA pilot samples were in similar agreement on Item 13 regarding their expectations 
of FOQA to positively impact operational safety (I expect the FOQA program to positively 











Figure 4. Positive Perceptions Scale Comparison (continued.) 
 
Frequency Distribution - Negative Perception Scale  
As with the Positive Perceptions Scale, many of the response distributions of items associated 
with the Negative Perceptions Scale had similarity between the FAA and GSA pilot samples as 




enforcement action against pilots for non-compliance with federal regulations and/or non-
compliance with approved company safe operating procedures which can result in fines and/or 
suspension or revocation of a pilot certificate. For a commercial pilot, the result can be the 
removal of the pilot’s livelihood. Both pilot samples (FAA and GSA) seemed to be worried that 
FOQA data would be used as a source of information for FAA to process regulatory violation 
actions against them. Specifically, over 43% of the FAA pilots agreed or strongly agreed with 
Item 5 (I worry that FOQA data will be a source of information for enforcement action against 
pilots), while 54% of the GSA pilot sample agreed or strongly agreed with it.  
Management’s access to FOQA data which collects individual pilot performance data can 
also be a concern for pilots. Item 3 addressed this issue - I trust management will not misuse 
FOQA data against individual pilots. The response results from both samples were similar. 
Specifically, the 55.3% of the GSA pilot sample agreed or strongly agreed with Item 3, while 
67.0% of the FAA pilots agreed or strongly agreed with the statement.  
Item 9 was more specific regarding pilot concerns about management’s potential misuse 
of FOQA data (I worry that FOQA data will be used for disciplinary actions). A similar response 
pattern between the FAA and GSA samples was reported on Item 9. The GSA pilot sample 
expressed agreement or strong agreement (58.1%), while the FAA pilot sample reported a 44.2% 
agreement or strong agreement with the concern that FOQA data would be used for disciplinary 
actions.   
Pilot concerns of FOQA data being released during civil litigation was addressed in Item 
16 (I worry that FOQA data could be released through civil litigation). The responses from both 




continuous monitoring of pilot performance and its subsequent actual or potential negative 
impact on pilot morale was assessed in Item 14 (A FOQA program has negatively impacted, or 
will negatively impact, the morale of our pilots). The GSA and FAA pilot samples were also 
nearly identical in their response to this item indicating their agreement or strong agreement 
(30.7% and 30.1% respectively).  
 









The means and standard deviations from both samples on both the Positive and Negative 
Perceptions Scales were fairly similar as seen in Table 7 (Summary of the Means and Standard 
Deviations by Pilot Sample). 
Table 7. 
 
Summary of Means and Standard Deviations by Pilot Sample 
 
 Group N M SD 
Positive Perceptions Scale 
FAA 95 3.00 .48 
GSA 92 3.01 .52 
Negative Perceptions Scale 
FAA 95 2.41 .64 




Research Question 1 
Research Question 1 hypothesized that pilots flying under a FOQA program (FAA pilot sample) 
would have more positive perceptions of FOQA than their counterparts who were not flying 
under a FOQA program.   
A t-test was performed and confirmed that there were no significant differences between public 
sector pilots flying under a FOQA program (FAA sample) and those pilots not flying under a 
FOQA program (GSA sample) on the Positive Perceptions Scale (t (185) = .24; p=.81). 




significant differences between the positive perceptions of federal public sector pilots flying with 
a FOQA program and their counterparts not flying under a FOQA program. 
Research Question 2 
Research Question 2 hypothesized that pilots flying without a FOQA program (GSA sample) 
would have more Negative Perceptions Scale scores than their counterparts flying with a FOQA 
program (FAA sample). Both groups had similar mean scores on the negative perceptions scale 
(FAA 2.41, GSA 2.56). A t-test was performed and confirmed that there were no significant 
differences between FAA pilots flying under a FOQA program and those pilots not flying under 
a FOQA program on the Negative Perceptions Scale (t(185)= 1.56; p=.12). Therefore the null 
hypothesis for this research question was accepted and there are no significant differences 
between the negative perceptions of federal public sector pilots flying without a FOQA program 
and their counterparts flying with a FOQA program. 
Research Question 3 
Research Question 3 determined if there was any relationship between pilot education levels and 
their perceptions of FOQA.  The two groups (FAA pilots and GSA pilots) were compared on the 
one independent variable (level of education) which was gathered using the PFOQA survey 
instrument. One-way analysis of variance (ANOVA) was used to test the null hypothesis that 
education level has no relationship with either Positive or Negative Perceptions scale scores.  
The PFOQA survey enabled each respondent to report seven different education levels; however 
the survey results had to be combined due to insufficient cell frequencies in four of the seven 
categories (i.e., Less than high school, high school diploma, some college, and Associate or two-




Standard Deviations for Positive and Negative Perceptions Scale Scores by Education Level), 
reflect this revision i.e., four instead of seven educational categories. 
Table 8. 
 








N M SD M SD 
Less than high school, high school 
diploma, some college, Associate or two-
year degree 
44 3.09 .52 2.43 .70 
Bachelor’s degree 45 3.00 .49 2.37 .56 
Some graduate education 38 2.94 .46 2.62 .80 
Graduate degree 55 3.04 .46 2.51 .64 
 
The results of one-way ANOVA indicated that education level was not related to Positive 
Perceptions scale F(3.178) = .69, p=.56, but the ANOVA did reveal that the F ratio slightly 
exceeded 1 on the Negative Perceptions Scale(F(3.179) = 1.04; p=.38); however statistical 
significance was not reached. Therefore, the null hypothesis for this research question was 
accepted and there is no relationship between federal public sector pilot education levels and 
positive or negative perceptions of FOQA. 
Research Question 4 
This research question hypothesized that pilots with FOQA experience would have higher 




attempted to compare the Positive Perception scales with the reported demographic variable 
indicating the degree of the pilot’s experience with FOQA. Unfortunately missing values 
precluded this analysis because the total sample was reduced (N = 144), and the distribution of 
the variable was decidedly non-normal. Deletion of the outliers failed to correct the departures 
from normality primarily due to the large subset that had no experience with FOQA thereby 
rendering this variable unsuitable for parametric analysis. In addition, the number of ties also 
made this variable unsuitable for most non-parametric rank order alternative analysis. The 
researcher dichotomized the experience variable (i.e., 0 = No FOQA experience, 1 = FOQA 
experience) to enable analysis using the Pearson Product-Moment Correlation point-biserial 
correlation.  
As shown Table____, Summary of Means and Standard Deviations for Positive and Negative 
Perceptions Scale Scores by Total Participation, pilots with FOQA experience had slightly 
higher Positive Perceptions Scale scores than those without FOQA experience. The one-tailed 
point-biserial correlation indicated that there was no reliable relationship between the Positive 
Perceptions scale and FOQA experience (rpb(142) = .09; p = .14). Therefore, the null hypothesis 
for this research question was accepted and there is no relationship between positive public 
sector pilot perceptions of FOQA and the amount of time spent (experience) in a FOQA 
program.  
Research Question 5 
This research question hypothesized that pilots with FOQA experience would have lower 
Negative Perceptions Scale scores than pilots without FOQA experience. As shown in Table 9 




experience had lower Negative Perceptions Scale scores than those without FOQA experience. 
The one-tailed point-biserial correlation indicated that there was an association between lower 
Negative Perceptions Scale scores and FOQA experience (rpb(142) = -.16; p= .03). Although an 
association exists, the association is extremely small and thus has little practical importance. 
Therefore the null hypothesis for this research question was accepted and there is no relationship 
between negative public sector pilot perceptions of FOQA and the amount of time spent 




Summary of Means and Standard Deviations by Total Participation 
 
 Group N M SD 
Positive Perceptions Scale 
No FOQA experience 54 3.00 .43 
FOQA experience 90 3.09 .50 
Negative Perceptions Scale 
No FOQA experience 54 2.59 .67 










The American Management Association reported in 2007 that 82% of the 
managers surveyed used some type of electronic monitoring system to ascertain 
employee performance; however privacy issues, misuse and inappropriate release of 
electronic data were common potential employee concerns (Papini, 2007). Flight 
Operational Quality Assurance Programs (FOQA) electronically monitor pilot 
performance and provide air operators the ability to continuously and routinely digitally 
record aircraft operational data that can be used to recreate any flight for playback and 
future analysis. FOQA playback enables a three-dimensional time sequenced view of 
aircraft movements, cockpit instruments and switch positions in synchronization with the 
pilot’s movement of flight controls and power levers. Thus, FOQA provides a robust 
objective picture of pilot performance.   
Safety and economic performance has improved within air carriers that have 
implemented FOQA programs.  For example, FOQA data have uncovered pilots flying 
high speed approaches contrary to safe operating procedures, and/or the airline’s 




runways and excessive wear on the aircraft’s tires and brakes (Lacagnina & Rosenkrans, 1998).  
Electronic monitoring of pilot performance through FOQA has also been economically 
advantageous by preventing aircraft from being removed from revenue service when it otherwise 
would be required. For example, when a pilot exceeds the maximum engine temperature 
limitations on a FOQA equipped aircraft the actual temperature and duration of the excursion is 
recorded and available to maintenance personnel. Without FOQA, maintenance personnel must 
rely upon a pilot’s subjective recollection and subsequent hand written recordings in the 
aircraft’s maintenance logbook which results in increased aircraft downtime and potentially 
needless component removal and replacement. Not surprisingly, FOQA programs have been 
enthusiastically endorsed by the United States Congress, the Federal Aviation Administration 
(FAA), and the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). On the other hand, only 35% 
of the large air carriers and 17% of small air carriers had a FOQA program as of January 2011, 
and negative pilot perceptions have been alleged by the U.S. Government Accountability Office 
(GAO) and others to be one of the primary barriers to the expansion of this important voluntary 
safety program (U.S. Government Accountability Office, 1997, 2010; Federal Aviation 
Administration, 2011a).  
Little is known about pilot perceptions of being electronically monitored by FOQA. No 
survey had been conducted prior to this study, nor was a valid and reliable survey instrument 
available for gathering pilot perceptions prior to April 2011. This was the first research study 
using the newly developed sixteen item questionnaire known as the PFOQA survey instrument 
which was co-authored by Dr. Thomas R. Chidester, Manager of the FAA Aerospace Human 
Factors Research Division, and Mr. Thomas C. Accardi, former Director of FAA Aviation 




agreement with nine positive and seven negative items about FOQA programs reported on a four 
point Likert scale (Strongly Agree, Agree, Disagree, and Strongly Disagree) – a format widely 
recognized as one of the best for collecting information about attitudes Nunnally, 1978” (as cited 
in Pfleiderer & Chidester, 2011, p. 1). This research compared two independent samples of 
public sector pilot perceptions of FOQA – one operating with a FOQA program (FAA sample) 
and the other without a FOQA program (GSA sample). In addition, relationships between FOQA 
perceptions and two demographic variables (education and FOQA experience) were studied.  
During 2010/2011, there were 396 public sector pilots operating aircraft in flight 
including border patrol, forest fires fighting and weather data gathering; however the FAA flight 
inspection organization responsible for the calibration of navigational equipment was the only 
federal agency operating aircraft with a FOQA program. This FAA pilot group (188 pilots) was 
used for an independent sample (FAA survey), while the remaining public sector pilots (n=208) 
operating without a FOQA program constituted the second independent sample (GSA survey) for 
comparative research purposes. Response rates were 56% and 46% respectively on the FAA and 
GSA surveys.  
This research hypothesized that pilots flying under a FOQA program would have more 
positive perceptions, and lower negative perceptions, of FOQA than their counterparts not flying 
under a FOQA program. No significant differences between the two independent samples were 
found on either the positive or negative PFOQA perceptions scale and the null hypothesis was 
accepted on both research questions one and two.  
This researcher also sought to ascertain if there was any relationship between pilot 




significant relationship between educational levels and perceptions of FOQA on either the 
positive or negative perception scales. The null hypothesis was accepted on research question 
three.    
This research hypothesized that pilots with FOQA experience would have higher positive 
perception scale scores, and lower negative perception scale scores, than pilots operating without 
FOQA experience. No statistically significant difference was found between pilots with FOQA 
experience vs. those without on the positive perceptions scale. Pilots with FOQA experience had 
significantly lower negative perceptions of FOQA than pilots without FOQA experience; 
however, this relationship was too small to have any practical importance and the null hypothesis 
was accepted on both research questions four and five. 
 
Conclusions 
The safety and economic benefits of FOQA have been thoroughly established in large 
U.S. air carriers since its early beginnings over a half century ago with British Airways and TAP 
Air Portugal in the early 1960’s (Lacagnina & Rosenkrans, 2004). FOQA is a unique contributor 
to aviation safety because it provides objective quantitative data on actual flight operations, 
rather than what has traditionally been available from subjective human observations of flight 
crew performance. The U.S. implementation of FOQA has not taken root throughout all sectors 
of the United States aviation industry despite the availability and reduced cost of data recording 
technologies and FAA’s active promotion of FOQA as a voluntary program for nearly two 
decades. The FAA reported that FOQA has been voluntarily adopted by 44% (41 of 93) of the 




but that number had declined to 35% by January 2011 (Federal Aviation Administration, 2011a). 
Thus, not only have small air operators ignored the safety benefits of FOQA, but more troubling, 
the number of large U.S. air carriers voluntarily participating is declining. Effective safety risk 
management requires data gathering, consolidation, analysis and assessment of relevant safety 
information. Without broader FOQA adoption, robust consolidated safety information systems 
will not develop to support aviation safety risk management models to identify incident and 
accident precursors that are needed by both large and small air operators and the FAA.  
Negative perceptions by pilots of FOQA’s electronic monitoring have been alleged to be 
a barrier and reason for air operators to not adopt FOQA as part of their safety assurance 
programs (Flight Safety Foundation, 1992; U.S. GAO, 1997, 2010). The United States General 
Accountability Office has maintained that one reason for the reluctance of operators to adopt 
FOQA was due to negative pilot perceptions of it (U.S. Government Accountability Office, 
1997, 2010). This research has found no significant differences in public sector pilot perceptions 
of FOQA between those operators with a FOQA program and those without, and thus negative 
pilot perceptions are probably not a major reason for small public sector operators’ failure to 
adopt a voluntary FOQA program.  
All pilots receive many different types of monitoring throughout their flying career by 
check airman, FAA inspectors and training department evaluators, etc. These systems provide 
limited insights into the overall safety performance of the air operator. Aiello and Kolb (1995) 
found that individual electronic monitoring systems were less likely to be accepted by employees 
than broader monitoring systems. Grant & Higgins (1987) also found routine vs. occasional 
electronic monitoring was found to lead to increased perceptions of fairness. FOQA provides 




recording capabilities. The findings of this research on public sector pilot perceptions of 
electronic monitoring by FOQA are consistent with the findings of Grant & Higgins (1987) and 
the findings of Aiello & Kolb (1995).  
This research implies that pilot fears and negative perceptions of FOQA may be 
mitigated after adoption of a FOQA program. The FAA pilot sample operating with a FOQA 
program had stronger trust in management not to misuse FOQA data than their counterparts not 
operating with a FOQA program (67% vs. 55.3%). In addition, there was less worry by the FAA 
pilots that FOQA data would be used for disciplinary actions (44.2% vs. 58.1%) suggesting that 
anticipated concerns and fears can probably be mitigated if trust can be maintained with the 
pilots after adoption of a FOQA program. The results of this research also indicate that FAA 
pilots operating with a FOQA program (FAA survey) demonstrated considerable faith in the 
confidentiality that a FOQA gatekeeper can provide. A designated gatekeeper is the only person 
with access to the pilot’s association with a given flight, and thus the gatekeeper can perform the 
important role of maintaining pilot confidentiality. More than 75% of the FAA pilots surveyed 
agreed with Item 2 (Gatekeepers are the only persons able to access identifying information that 
associates a pilot or pilots with exceedances). Thus, the manner in which an air operators’ 
management partners with the pilot union or employee representative organization to protect the 
confidentiality of individual pilots may be an important variable in the pilot’s perceptions of 
informational justice and continued acceptance of FOQA. McNall & Roch (2009) found that 
electronic monitoring was positively related to perceptions of informational justice and Douthitt 
and Aiello (2001) and Alge (2001) found that monitored participants who were given the 
opportunity to voice their opinion about the design and implementation of the monitoring system 




design and implementation of a FOQA program may be an important variable in the initial and 
continued acceptance of FOQA by pilots. Finally, both pilot samples appeared to generally have 
confidence in the safety benefits of adopting a FOQA program because they both agreed, or 
strongly agreed, with the statement that adoption of a FOQA program would positively impact 
the safety of their organizations (GSA 88.7%; FAA 83.7%). 
Worry that FOQA data would be released for use in civil litigation was a significant and 
almost identical concern within both the FAA and GSA pilot samples (72.8% and 73.9% 
respectively). Many new aircraft have hundreds of sensors and quick access flight data recorders 
(QAR’s) installed as standard equipment enabling flight data analysis information to be readily 
available and accessible for management review of individual airman performance. In addition, 
this data is unprotected from release to outside organizations. Ironically, a pilot operating a 
modern aircraft for an operator without a FOQA program may be more vulnerable to flight data 
monitoring misuse than if the pilot were operating with a FOQA program because informational 
justice may be more difficult to obtain without the data protection provisions routinely afforded 
those operators with an FAA approved FOQA program. Clearly, the distinction between pilots 
operating under a FOQA program and those operating without one has become increasingly 
blurred due to the reduction in technology costs and the routine installation of electronic 
monitoring systems on modern aircraft of all sizes.  
Large air operators are in the process of implementing Safety Management Systems 
(SMS) to identify and mitigate operational safety risks. FOQA can and should be a critical 
source of objective flight safety data enabling the expansion of organizational knowledge and 
aviation safety in general. Concurrently, adoption of FOQA can probably contribute to the 




if FOQA data is properly managed and FOQA data gatekeepers representing pilots are properly 
integrated into the air operators’ data protection plans and processes. This research may assist 
FAA regulators and other aviation industry trade groups in promoting voluntary adoption of 
FOQA, especially if subsequent research with other private sector pilot groups is found to be 
consistent with this research of federal public sector pilots.  
 
Recommendations 
The United States Federal Aviation Administration has been a global leader in aviation 
safety for decades, and the developing world continues to follow the lead of the United States in 
aviation safety. Safety risk management is a key component of global initiatives aimed at a 
continuous reduction of aviation’s enviable safety record. ICAO mandated Safety Management 
Systems (SMS) for international operations in 2009 by requiring aircraft weighing in excess of 
59,525 lbs. to establish and maintain a flight data analysis (FDA), or FOQA program. FAA has 
chosen to maintain FOQA as a voluntary program (Federal Aviation Administration, 2010a) for 
large air operations (operating under CFR 49, Federal Aviation Regulations Part 121) and has 
not proposed an SMS program for U.S. small air operators (operating under CFR 49, Federal 
Aviation Regulations Part 135).  
The United States has obligations under the Convention on International Civil Aviation to 
either conform to ICAO Standards, or file a difference with ICAO by notifying other member 
States of the United States non-compliance with the adopted international ICAO standard. If 
FOQA becomes adopted by ICAO as a required part of the ICAO mandated Safety Management 




new mandatory FOQA requirement to conform with ICAO standards, or FAA will be required to 
file a difference with ICAO indicating the United States will remain out of compliance with 
ICAO’s flight data analysis standard. If the Federal Aviation Administration choses to file a 
difference with ICAO, thereby disagreeing with the international commitment to make flight 
data analysis a requirement of the State’s SMS program, the United States government will be 
sending a powerful negative signal to the global aviation community regarding it’s opinion of the 
safety benefits of flight data analysis as a component of a robust safety management system. 
Finally, international small air operators of U.S. aircraft and/or large business jet operators in 
non-commercial carriage may find that they are increasingly detained in other countries for 
failure of the U.S. to comply with international standards, thereby causing adverse economic 
impact for the U.S. aviation industry and embarrassment for the global leader in aviation safety. 
Recommendation 1 
FAA should form a government/industry task force to promote FOQA adoption by small air 
operators to increase agency credibility with Congress and the aviation industry. 
The United States Congress recognized the need for air carriers to implement safety 
management systems by passing the Airline Safety and Federal Aviation Administration 
Extension Act of 2010 known as Public Law 111-216. This public law requires the FAA to 
conduct rulemaking to require all CFR 49 FAR part 121 air carriers to implement a safety 
management system and consider mandating existing voluntary safety programs such as FOQA 
(italics added) (Airline Safety and Federal Aviation Extension Act, 2010). Safety Management 
Systems are supposed to be comprehensive, process-oriented approaches to managing safety 




5.71) will require organizations to develop and maintain processes to analyze safety risk and 
maintain processes and systems to acquire data (italics added) with respect to its operations, 
products and services (Federal Aviation Administration, 2011b), but these proposed regulations 
do not mandate a FOQA program as part of the operators safety management system to acquire 
safety data. Thus, FAA’s SMS regulations could quickly become hollow if air operators do not 
voluntarily adopt FOQA as part of a comprehensive safety data gathering system to identify and 
mitigate organizational risk. Therefore, it is recommended that FAA initiate the development of 
a broad based industry led flight data analysis team of industry representatives to reenergize and 
promote the best practices in the initiation and operation of FOQA programs throughout all 
segments of the aviation industry, but especially in those segments that have shunned voluntary 
adoption. Acceptance of this recommendation should result in the FAA being better prepared to 
address and demonstrate the FAA’s compliance with the Congressional intent of Public Law 
111-216, section 215 and put substance into the proposed data analysis requirements of FAA’s 
proposed SMS regulations.  
Recommendation 2 
 FAA should submit to Congress proposed language to be included in FAA’s FY15 budget that 
would protect sensitive aviation information (FOQA) from litigation discovery.  
Congress did not create a statutory privilege for FOQA, and thus the United States 
Magistrate Judge in the Eastern District of Kentucky chose to release voluntarily generated 
safety reports to litigants in a wrongful death lawsuit. The potential for civil and/or criminal suits 
against individual pilots exists. The prosecution of the pilots of an Airbus A320 that crashed in 




(FDA) data. The captain was sentenced to six months in prison (Mateou & Mateou, 2010). This 
research found that pilots with and without FOQA programs were worried about the release of 
FOQA data in civil litigation. FAA’s data protection provisions outlined in Federal Regulation 
Part 193 does nothing to address this concern. In fact, the regulation enables public disclosure of 
FOQA data to carry out a criminal investigation or prosecution (Comair’s motion for a protective 
order…, 2008). Therefore, FAA should demonstrate support for the sanctity of voluntary safety 
data gathering programs, such as FOQA, by requesting Congress to enact legislation that 
expressly prohibits its release during the discovery process of civil litigation. Congress protected 
cockpit voice recorder transcripts from discovery by litigants, and thus there is a relevant 
precedent (Comair’s motion for a protective order…2008). FAA’s request to Congress will 
demonstrate the agencies’ commitment to the protection of FOQA data and will likely engender 
industry trust, credibility and support for further adoption of FOQA. 
Recommendation 3 
The FAA should reconsider the long standing position that FOQA should be a voluntary safety 
program for all United States air operators by convening an Aviation Rulemaking Advisory 
Committee (ARAC) to review FAA’s existing policy and make recommendations for potential 
future rulemaking. 
The international aviation community is composed of 188 contracting states of the 
International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO). ICAO has had a requirement since 2005 
requiring all aircraft operating internationally (weighing in excess of 59,525 lbs.) to establish and 
maintain a flight data analysis (FDA) or FOQA program. ICAO Annex 6, Part 1, Section 3.2 also 




than 44,093 lbs. Although this has been an ICAO international standard and recommended 
practice for nearly a decade, FAA has chosen to maintain FOQA as a voluntary program (Federal 
Aviation Administration, 2010a). After nearly two decades, it is time to formally revisit FAA’s 
FOQA policy because FOQA has lost momentum in the United States.   
The creation of an ARAC to address FAA’s current voluntary FOQA policy will 
demonstrate FAA’s compliance with the Airline Safety and Federal Aviation Administration 
Extension Act of 2010 known as Public Law 111-216 which requires the FAA to consider 
mandating existing voluntary safety programs such as FOQA (italics added) (Airline Safety and 
Federal Aviation Extension Act, 2010). In addition, by creating an ARAC, FAA will enable 
industry to submit recommendations for consideration in rulemaking without committing itself to 
amendment of the current voluntary FOQA policy.  
Recommendation 4 
Senior leaders of aviation organizations should seriously consider adopting FOQA as a 
component of their safety program to reduce their potential personal and corporate liability.  
A corporate accident is defined as “one whose ultimate root cause can be traced back to a 
failure of corporate systems” (Whittingham, 2008, p. 1). Civil and criminal inquiries into 
corporate accidents have revealed poor, or non-existent management controls, or defective 
management systems, as the most common root cause of a corporate accident (Whittingham, 
2008, p. 176). The FAA’s proposed SMS regulation requires the designation of an executive who 
is accountable and responsible with the final authority for the safety performance of the 
organization. It also requires the development of systems to acquire data to monitor 




leaders may find themselves the subject of civil litigation by not implementing FOQA programs 
that might have identified risk and precursors of serious incidents or accidents involving death or 
injury, and subsequently be charged with defective management systems that were not in 
compliance with the international safety standards and the expectations of a reasonable and 
prudent aviation executive committed to the highest levels of aviation safety.  
Recommendation 5 
FAA should initiate an industry research agenda to ascertain the barriers perceived by small 
operators to adopting FOQA.   
This researcher has concluded that public sector pilot perceptions of FOQA are an 
appropriate area of research. Pilot concerns were very similar across the public sector pilot 
community regardless of whether or not they operated with or without a FOQA program, or 
whether the  individual pilot had FOQA experience. This research was the first research 
conducted on pilot perceptions of FOQA, but it was confined to federal public sector pilots. The 
FAA should conduct further research on barriers perceived by other pilot groups in the private 
sector. Additional research is needed to broaden the base of pilot perceptions of FOQA beyond 
the federal public sector pilot community to ascertain if the same or different perceptions of 
FOQA are present.  
Recommendation 6 
Qualitative research should be conducted with air operators who have voluntarily adopted a 




Large air carriers who have adopted FOQA programs over the past two decades have 
probably developed methods to mitigate pilot concerns about being electronically monitored by 
FOQA. Qualitative research should be conducted through standardized structured interviews to 
ascertain the methods used by management at air operators with FOQA programs. For example, 
management can develop policies and corporate practices that provide pilot confidentiality by 
establishing trusted FOQA gatekeepers, or management can chose to use FOQA data to 
investigate, discipline and/or intimidate its employees. Qualitative research focused upon 
developing an understanding of managements’ attitudes about FOQA would be an important 
complement to this research. This research found that 67% of the pilots operating under a FOQA 
program (FAA sample) had trust that management would not misuse FOQA data against 
individual pilots. Therefore, it is recommended that qualitative research be conducted with 
management officials at air operators with a FOQA program to ascertain the specific issues and 
mitigation strategies used to engender trust and continued acceptance of being electronically 
monitored by FOQA. Finally, a qualitative study could ultimately lead to a compendium of best 
FOQA practices that could be available to both the FAA and the aviation industry to promote 
voluntary FOQA adoption by small air operators.  
 Public sector small air operators operate in a variety of environments that pose risk to 
safe operations. FAA’s promotion of safety data analysis by air operators through voluntary 
adoption of FOQA has stalled. FOQA has not been accepted by the small air operator sector for 
nearly two decades. This research has found few differences in perceptions of FOQA within the 
public sector pilot community, and thus pilot perceptions do not appear to be a barrier to 
voluntary adoption of FOQA, at least within the federal public sector. FAA should formally 




safety management system. If FAA desires to retain global leadership in flight data analysis and 
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